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This thesis identifies evolutionary trends in ground 
maneuver, tactical air power, and fratricide during the 20th 
century. It explores two variables that account for most 
fratricides in warfare: the loss of situational awareness, and 
the lack of positive target identification. This study also 
addresses how contemporary U.S. warfighting doctrine 
contributes to the loss of situational awareness and compounds 
an already faulty target identification process. This thesis 
argues that the primary causes of fratricide have remained 
constant despite rapid changes in technology and the 
increasing complexity of U.S. air-land operations. When normal 
human failings are coupled with the absence of positive target 
identification, the end-result may often be casualties from 
friendly-fire. The complexity of maneuver and modern air-land 
operations often compound errors in human situational 
awareness. This thesis provides recommendations to help the 
U.S. armed forces improve combat identification efforts and 
reduce fratricide while retaining their existing superiority 
in air-land operations. 
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Fratricide, also known as friendly-fire, is defined as 
death or injury to friendly personnel from fire whose intended 
target is the enemy. It has always been a part of warfare. 
This study suggests that most fratricides stem from two causal 
factors: the loss of situational awareness, and the lack of 
positive target identification. The detrimental effects of 
these two factors are exacerbated by current U.S. air-land 
doctrine which strains the ability of humans to maintain 
situational awareness and identify targets on a fast-moving 
battlefield. The merging of technology with high tempo air-
land operations often compounds errors in human situational 
awareness. When these interactions are coupled with the 
absence of positive target identification, the end-result will 
almost always be casualties from friendly-fire. 
Chapter II analyzes situational awareness and target 
identification with emphasis on the influence that maneuver 
warfare has on these variables. In combat, the inability to 
maintain situational awareness often results in fratricide 
from failures in fire and maneuver control, navigation, and 
command and control. Combat also makes it difficult to 
identify forces as friendly, neutral, or hostile. In battle, 
targets can be acquired and engaged at long range, but they 
cannot be positively identified at long range. This imbalance 
in capabilities heightens the risk of fratricide for the U.S. 
military, which relies on high lethality weapons that 
frequently operate well beyond visual range. Mistaken identity 
on the battlefield often results in friendly-fire casualties 
because of difficulties identifying visual, thermal, or 
optical signatures, limited visibility or restricted terrain, 
and similarities between friendly and enemy equipment. 
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Chapter III examines evolutionary trends in fratricide 
stemming from the employment of tactical air power in support 
of ground maneuver. During World War I, significant problems 
were encountered with air-land integration, especially when 
battle lines shifted or fluctuated. These same difficulties 
were experienced on a much larger scale by German and Allied 
forces during World War II. Fluid, mechanized operations made 
air-land coordination and fratricide avoidance more 
problematic. Similar integration and friendly-fire problems 
were apparent in Southeast Asia where the use of improved 
weaponry greatly compressed the time available for target 
identification and engagement decisions. Finally, the Gulf War 
illustrated how difficult it is for combat leaders to maintain 
situational awareness and identify targets, even in the face 
of very light enemy resistance. Despite the high degree of 
Coalition unity and teamwork, 28 known instances of friendly-
fire occurred, of which nine involved air-land forces. The 
thesis argues that the primary causes of fratricide have 
remained constant, but that the evolutionary trend toward 
technical complexity in warfare may exacerbate the primary 
causes of friendly-fire. 
Chapter IV examines the challenge of solving the complex 
problem of fratricide. Most friendly-fire incidents have many 
causal pathways which requires a balanced and complementary 
strategy to approach the problem from a technological, 
doctrinal, and organizational perspective. Technical 
initiatives to enhance combat identification and reduce 
fratricide range from the application of VS-17 thermal panels 
to digitization of the battlefield. Joint doctrine also plays 
a critical role in enhancing fratricide awareness by 
addressing the problem in peacetime training and in war. 
Organizational measures include restructuring the defense 
establishment and emphasizing training measures to develop 
xiv 
U.S. combat identification capabilities and reduce fratricide. 
Chapter V proposes that the following research findings 
should be considered in the formulation of U.S. policy on 
combat identification and fratricide reduction: 
• The loss of situational awareness and the lack 
of positive target identification account for 
most incidents of air-land fratricide. 
• U.S. target acquisition and weapon system 
technologies have outpaced target identification 
capabilities. Most target identification in 
battle is still visual. 
• Similarities between friendly and enemy combat 
systems degrade target identification efforts and 
increase the risk of fratricide. 
• Fratricide can be reduced but not eliminated. 
• The American public and government leaders have 
become more aware of casualties caused by 
friendly-fire. 
• Fratricide can significantly degrade U.S. 
warfighting capabilities. 
• Military Coalitions are ad-hoc organizations 
that may be polarized by fratricide incidents. 
The following policy recommendations identify areas 
that can be improved in joint combat identification and 
fratricide reduction efforts: 
• Maintain the current broad-based emphasis on 
enhancing combat identification and avoiding 
fratricide. 
• Apply a greater emphasis on training and 
professional education. 
• The U.S. should vigorously pursue combat 
identification and fratricide avoidance 
capabilities with Alliance partners. 
• Insist that new weapon systems have integrated 
combat identification capabilities that are 
commensurate with target engagement ranges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. SCOPE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
This study analyzes the critical and frequently 
misunderstood relationship between tactical air power, 
maneuver, and fratricide in modern warfare. This study 
suggests that most air-land fratricides occur because of two 
factors: (1) loss of situational awareness (SA) and, (2) the 
lack of positive target identification (TI). The effects of 
these factors are aggravated by the adoption of maneuver as 
the primary U.S. warfighting technique, and by the continued 
use of target identification capabilities that have not kept 
pace with advances in detection and engagement. This disparity 
in U.S. warfighting capabilities fosters many of the 
conditions leading to the problem of air-land fratricide, 
especially during joint and multinational operations. 
In this thesis, the term "fratricide" means the 
employment of weapons and munitions against the enemy in a way 
that results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury 
to friendly personnel. 1 Other frequently-used terms that have 
the same meaning include amicide, blue on blue, and friendly-
fire. This thesis considers one important subset of the entire 
fratricide puzzle: losses inflicted on ground forces from the 
air. It focuses specifically on the interaction between ground 
maneuver elements and close air support (CAS) in order to 
illuminate common patterns, evolutionary trends, and 
interactions that can be used to address the general problem 
of fratricide in combat. 
The study of fratricide in air-land operations requires 
1 U.S. Army, Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fratricide: 
Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses, CALL Newsletter 92-4 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April1992), 
3. 
1 
familiarity with a wide range of military subjects, and draws 
upon a wide range of literature on the subject of ground 
maneuver, CAS, and friendly-fire. The author has also 
interviewed many U.S. government officials who have been 
pursuing solutions to current and projected shortfalls in air-
land integration and joint combat identification (CID) . Their 
insights, suggestions, and encouragement helped this 
investigation into an enduring and troubling problem. 
Two major themes predominate. The first revolves around 
U.S. air-land operations as they have evolved throughout the 
20th century. The second focuses on the causal interactions 
that have resulted in air-land fratricides. The conceptual 
model applied throughout is based upon maneuver warfare 
theory. 
As embraced by the U.S. military, maneuver warfare refers 
to a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's 
cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected 
actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating 
situation with which the enemy cannot cope. 2 The goal of 
maneuver warfare is to attack the enemy's critical 
vulnerabilities on the most favorable terms possible, thereby 
rendering attritional combat unnecessary. At the operational 
level, the art of maneuver does not rely solely on massed 
forces, set-piece battles, or superior firepower to reduce the 
enemy's strength and ability to resist, even when they are 
available. Maneuver hinges on destroying the enemy's will to 
fight by means other than the wholesale destruction of his 
armed forces, and specifically by pitting strength against 
weakness. 
Military organizations that operate with high efficiency 
2 Department ofthe Navy, FMFM-1 War:fighting (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1989), 59. 
2 
and minimum risk despite the chaos and uncertainty of combat 
will most likely achieve success. This study also argues that 
the intricacy of maneuver and air-land operations often 
compound errors in human situational awareness. When these 
human shortcomings are linked with the absence of positive 
target identification, the result may well be an increase in 
casualties from friendly-fire. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Conventional warfare today is characterized by long range 
engagements, high kill probabilities, and massed formations 
capable of operating over vast areas at high speed. On the 
modern battlefield, what can be seen can generally be hit; by 
extension, what can be hit can also be destroyed. Exploiting 
these capabilities, however, is not risk-free, primarily 
because weapons acquisition and kill technologies have 
progressed faster than most target identification systems. The 
resulting imbalance between acquisition, targeting, and 
identification complicates engagement decisions by ~trigger­
pullers," and markedly increases the danger of fratricide. 
From a historical perspective, fratricide is as timeless 
as warfare itself. Self-inflicted losses have always accounted 
for a significant portion of battle-related casualties. 
Consider Thucydide' s description of the aftermath of the 
Athenian night attack at Epipolae in 413 B.C.: 
~The Athenians now fell into great disorder and 
perplexity ... seeking one another, taking all in front of 
them for enemies, even although they might be some of 
their now flying friends ... They ended by coming into 
collision with each other in many parts of the field, 
friends with friends, and citizens with citizens, and not 
only terrified one another, but even came to blows and 
could only be parted with difficulty." 3 
3 Geoffrey Regan, Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire (New York: Avon Books, 
1995), 23. 
3 
Similar accounts can be found of battle during the middle 
ages, when densely packed masses of men on horse and foot 
fought hand-to-hand. Massed archery fire, which was a common 
tactic of English commanders particularly during this era, 
routinely resulted in accidental deaths, a problem that the 
advent of firearms made worse. One potential casualty might 
have been George Washington, who survived an encounter with a 
friendly British unit during the French and Indian War, in 
which more than 40 British soldiers died at the hands of their 
comrades. In the aftermath of Waterloo, the British Colonel 
commanding the 23rd Light Dragoons went so far as to declare 
that "we always lose more men by our own people than we do by 
the enemy. " 4 And while his remark was an exaggeration, it may 
serve as a reminder that self-inflicted losses have always 
been a significant concern for field commanders. 
In the 20th century, however, the fusion of technology 
and warfare has resulted in a frightful escalation of the 
total number of friendly-fire casual ties. The armies that 
fought World War I had tremendous difficulties coordinating 
infantry maneuver with supporting fire from naval platforms, 
artillery, and aviation. After the First World War, French 
General Alexandre Percin alleged in his book Le Massacre de 
Notre Infanterie, that 75,000 of France's 3.3 million 
casualties were due to artillery fratricide, yet the 
conditions that prevailed during World War II were, if 
anything, worse. 5 Friendly-fire incidents soared as 
battlefields became more complex and nonlinear. The problem 
was also compounded by the need for timely and effective 
4 John Keegan, The Face ofBattle (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 195. 
5 Alexandre Percin, Le Massacre de Notre Infanterie 1914-1918 (Paris: Albin-Michel, 
1921), 217-218. 
4 
combined arms integration between airplanes and increasingly 
mobile ground forces. 
The doctrinal union between CAS and high-speed, 
mechanized ground forces was in its infancy during the Second 
World War, and not well understood by American or Allied 
forces, even at the end. During the breakout from Normandy in 
1944, for instance, the Allies planned an operation, code-
named Cobra, that called for a heavy air bombardment of German 
defenses as a prelude to a general ground advance. Inadequate 
target identification, and poor coordination among the 
Services, compounded by poor situational awareness on the part 
of Allied pilots, resulted in extensive bombing of U.S. ground 
positions, with a loss of more than 150 killed and nearly 800 
wounded. 6 As a result, the Allies nearly abandoned the concept 
of using heavy bombers to support ground combat, though this 
was not done in the end because their usefulness, despite the 
difficulties, had become all too clear. 
Similar organizational problems have hampered many U.S. 
military operations since World War II. Instead progress has, 
if anything, been slower than the pace of technological 
advancement. The 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf provides a 
stark reminder of the deadly and unforgiving character of 
combat, even in the face of very light resistance. Over 17 
percent of American casualties in Operation Desert Storm (107 
of 613), and 24 percent of fatalities (35 of 146) are known to 
be the result of friendly-fire. 7 
One might expect fratricide to decline in low intensity 
conflict (LIC) and operations other than war (OOTW). In 
6 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign ofFrance and Gennany. 
1944-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 153. 
7 U.S. Department ofDefense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian 
Gulf War (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 589. 
5 
practice, significant improvement may be difficult to achieve, 
given the intricate security challenges these operations pose. 
Greater U.S. involvement in LIC and OOTW may simply add 
another dimension to the problem by exposing it more clearly 
to public and political scrutiny. 
On April 14, 1994, two U.S. Air Force F-15 jets under 
the control of an Air Force airborne warning and control plane 
(AWACS) accidentally shot down two U.S. Army Black Hawk 
helicopters in northern Iraq. This tragedy claimed the lives 
of 26 members of the Combined Task Force for Operation Provide 
Comfort, and paved the way for a comprehensive review of joint 
air command and control(C2 ) procedures and theater-specific 
rules of engagement (ROE) . The high-level interest and 
extensive media coverage it sparked highlights the degree to 
which the friendly-fire problem is likely to have special 
importance at the low end of the conflict spectrum. Unless 
positive actions are taken to deal with it, political and 
military leaders may find it difficult to obtain domestic and 
international support for similar operations in the future. 
C. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
Fratricide has been defined as "death or injury to 
friendly personnel from fire whose intended target is the 
enemy." This definition incorporates two distinct criteria: 
• Incidents must occur within the context of a U.S. 
military operation in which at least the potential 
for combat is recognized. 
• Casualty figures from homicides, accidents, and 
equipment malfunctions are excluded from fratricide 
reports and statistics. 
The definition of fratricide cited above does not address 
the issue of "near misses." It does provide a useful means of 
differentiating among the various sources of U.S. battle 
casualties. To be considered fratricide, incidents must take 
place in a combat setting and friendly forces must be trying 
6 
to engage the enemy. 
The Vietnam War saw 1,013 documented cases of attempted 
or successful killings of officers by their own men. 8 Despite 
the obvious combat setting, these occurrences are not 
fratricide, because there was no intent to engage enemy 
forces. A similar rationale applies to accidents and equipment 
malfunctions. For example, in 1968 a U.S. F-4 Phantom jet 
supporting troops engaged near Ban Me Thout, Vietnam, dropped 
a napalm canister on a church, killing 13 civilians. An 
investigation revealed that the cause was due to a faulty bomb 
rack.,9 Again, this incident is not fratricide, since the pilot 
did not release the napalm with the intent to engage enemy 
forces. Instead, equipment failure led to the inadvertent 
release of the ordnance that caused the accidental deaths of 
the Vietnamese civilians. 
Episodes of this kind share fratricide's primary effect-
friendly-fire losses - but not its underlying logic, which 
depends upon a conscious attempt to engage the enemy. 
Fratricide can also be distinguished, perhaps less 
categorically, by what might be called its secondary effects, 
which result not from actual friendly-fire losses, but from 
fear of them. Fear of fratricide from supporting arms can 
quickly render a unit ineffective. Concern over the possible 
degradation of U.S. warfighting capabilities prompted the 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1993 to report on the 
consequences of fratricide for military readiness. Table I 
outlines the major detrimental effects identified by the OTA 
8 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 127. 
9 Charles Schrader, Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modem War (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), 55. 
7 
study: 10 
• Hesitation to conduct limited visibility operations 
• Loss of confidence in unit's leadership 
• Increase in leader self-doubt 
• Hesitation to use supporting combat systems 
• Oversupervision of units 
• Loss of initiative 
• Loss of aggressiveness during fire and maneuver 
• Disrupted operations 
• Needless loss of combat power 
• General degradation of cohesion and morale 
Table I. Detrimental Effects of Fratricide From (OTA 
Report, 1993) 
Although not all these effects occur in all cases, 
fratricide's secondary effects clearly have the potential to 
disrupt operations across the entire battlefield. The 
consequences of tactical paralysis, aversion to risk, and so 
on, may well be as grave as those caused by friendly-fire 
itself. Combat leaders must not become so alert to the 
detrimental effects of fratricide that they also become too 
cautious, indecisive, or unwilling to take risks. During 
Operation Desert Storm, Coalition forces proved the importance 
of this point by maintaining constant pressure against 
critical Iraqi vulnerabilities in spite of many friendly-fire 
incidents. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
This study argues that most fratricides occur because of 
two predominant factors: (1) the loss of situational awareness 
10 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 19. 
8 
and, (2) the lack of positive target identification. Figure 1 
illustrates the primary variables that influence situational 
awareness, target identification, and fratricide . 11 It also 
contends that these risks are heightened by the adoption of 
maneuver as the primary warfighting technique. Maneuver 
warfare is a high risk method of warfighting that carries with 
it a proportionately greater chance for both success and 
catastrophic failure, including fratricide. 12 These issues are 
described in detail in Chapter II. 
Chapter III traces evolutionary trends in air-land 
fratricide, by means of historical case studies chosen to 
illustrate common patterns and key facets of the problem. The 
focus is on major conventional and unconventional conflicts 
where tactical air power and mobile ground forces were closely 
integrated. 
Chapter IV explores a broad range of technological, 
doctrinal, and organizational remedies to address shortfalls 
in joint combat identification. Here, and throughout the 
thesis, it is argued that multiple strategies are needed to 
cope with the many challenges posed by air-land fratricide. 
Chapter V outlines the research findings and provides 
policy recommendations to enhance U.S. efforts in the areas of 
CID and fratricide reduction. This study concludes by 
reinforcing the view that fratricide risks can be assessed, 
identified, and decreased with little degradation to the 
combat efficiency of U.S. military forces. 
11 U.S. Army, Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fratricide: 
Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses, CALL Newsletter 92-4 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April1992), 
9. 
12 Department of the Navy, FMFM-1 Warfighting (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1989), 29. 
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FRATRICIDE CAUSAL EFFECTS 
•FIRE AND MANEUVER CONTROL FAILURES 
•NAVIGATION FAILURES 
•coMMAND AND CONTROL FAILURES 
+-+ . . 
FRATRICIDE CAUSAL EFFECTS 
•INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH VISUAL, THERMAL, 
OR OPTICAL SIGNATURES 
•LIMITED VISIBILITY OR RESTRICTED TERRAIN 
•siMILARITIES BETWEEN FRIENDLY AND ENEMY 
EQUIPMENT 
Figure 1. Dynamics of Situational Awareness and Target 
Identification From (CALL Newsletter, 1992) 
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II. CAUSE AND EFFECT: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS,TARGET 
IDENTIFICATION, AND MANEUVER WARFARE 
A. WHAT IS GOING ON? 
In a military context, situational awareness refers to 
the real or near-real time accurate knowledge of one's own 
location (and orientation), plus the locations of friendly, 
enemy, neutral, and noncombatant personnel. 13 Developing true 
situational awareness requires a thorough understanding of 
many factors, including the commander's intent, mission, 
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and fire support available, 
and time. The concept of situational awareness refers to the 
mental process of knowing what is going on at any point and 
time in the surrounding environment. 
At a minimum, human beings need self-discipline, mental 
concentration, and time to develop good situational awareness 
for most tasks and activities. Humans must give a considerable 
amount of attention to build prioritized and sequential mental 
images of the immediate environment. 14 By comparison, losing 
situational awareness is very easy: it is the essence of what 
Clausewitz called the "fog of war." 
Persons who have lost their situational awareness 
generally focus on limited aspects of an otherwise complex and 
dynamic environment . 15 When this occurs, the rest of the 
environment may change so drastically that the person may lose 
13 Kenneth J. Mellin and John R. Ferguson, "Combat Identification-Are We Fixing What's 
Broken," paper presented at the Naval Postgraduate School Joint Service Combat Identification 
Systems Conference, Monterey, CA (14-16 November 1995), 44. 
14 Robert L. Shaw, Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering, (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1985), 291. 
15 Ibid, 291. 
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touch with the "actual" situation without realizing it. 
Depending upon the nature of the tasks and activities being 
performed, an attention lapse of a few seconds may lead to 
disorientation. 
To develop situational awareness, people need access to 
timely and reliable information about the combat environment. 
Ideally, most of this information is provided on a real or 
near-real time basis by military command, control, 
communications, and intelligence (C 3 I) networks. The real and 
near-real time qualities of U.S. C3 I networks have a 
significant impact on individual and collective situational 
awareness, systems interoperability, and the timely exchange 
of perishable combat information. 
1. Commander's Intent and METT-T 
One crucial aspect of situational awareness is a clear 
understanding of what the commander intends to do to the 
enemy. A well-crafted commander's intent conveys the senior 
leader's vision of success in a way that connects the mission 
with the concept of operations. Knowledge of the commander's 
intent is vital because it enhances situational awareness and 
enables subordinates to exercise sound judgement and decisive 
actions on a changing and fluid battlefield . 16 Another 
effective way to enhance situational awareness is to be 
familiar with combat factors like the mission, enemy, terrain 
and weather, troops and fire support available, and time. A 
helpful acronym that combines these military planning factors 
is referred to as METT-T, whose components are as follows: 
• Mission. The mission statement specifies the unit 
actions to be taken. A clear-cut mission statement 
enhances situational awareness by ensuring that 
16 Department of the Navy, FMFM-1 Warfighting (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1989), 72. 
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people understand what tasks they are expected to 
accomplish. 
• Enemy. Who is the enemy, how is he equipped, what 
can he do, and what is he likely to do? The 
acronyms SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, 
time, equipment) and DRAW-D (defend, reinforce, 
attack, withdraw, delay) may also be used to gain 
insights about the enemy and his intentions. SALUTE 
is used to identify who the enemy is, how he is 
equipped, and what he can do. DRAW-D is used to 
help determine what the enemy will probably do 
based upon capabilities. 
• Terrain and Weather. Information about vegetation, 
soil type, hydrology, climatic conditions, and 
light data that can be used to estimate the impact 
of environmental factors on enemy and friendly 
operations. For detailed analysis, the military 
aspects of terrain are usually grouped under the 
acronym KOCOA. 17 This acronym stands for: 
-Key Terrain. Any locality or area the seizure 
of which or retention of which affords a 
marked advantage to either combatant. 
-Obstacles. Anything (natural or artificial) 
that stops, impedes, or diverts military 
movement. 
-Cover and Concealment. Cover is the physical 
protection from the effects of fire. 
Concealment on the other hand refers to 
protection from observation or surveillance. 
-Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation 
means the area over which surveillance can be 
exercised either visually or by using 
surveillance devices, both optical and 
electronic. Fields of fire refers to the area 
a weapon or group of weapons may cover 
effectively with fire from a given position. 
17 Department ofthe Army, FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols (Washington 
D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Army, 1985), 1-47. 
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-Avenues of Approach. A route by which a force 
may reach its objective or key terrain. 
Avenues of approach are notably different for 
aviation, mechanized, and foot mobile units. 
-Weather. Refers to local meteorological 
conditions. This factor is usually considered 
in terms of potential impact on friendly and 
enemy operations, mobility, and morale. 
• Troops and Fire Support Available. The quantity, 
level of training, and psychological state of 
friendly forces. Some planning factors include the 
availability of firing agencies, the amount and 
type of ordnance available, and integration 
requirements for fire support. 
• Time. This refers to the 
planning, preparing, and 
operations. This is usually 
the enemy and friendly point 
time available for 
executing military 
cons ide red from both 
of view. 
Maintaining good situational awareness in a complex, 
changing, and uncertain combat environment is a profound 
challenge, even under low threat conditions. Cognizance of the 
commander's intent and METT-T factors enhances knowledge of 
the combat environment which reduces the risk of fratricide. 
Nevertheless, perfect situational awareness, and the 
elimination of risk from all military actions, are obviously 
unrealistic goals. 
2. The Loss of Situational Awareness and 
Fratricide 
The inability to maintain situational awareness in a 
combat environment is one of the primary causes of fratricide. 
Although every friendly-fire incident has unique 
circumstances, those involving the loss of situational 
awareness are often characterized by fire and maneuver control 
failures, navigation failures, and command and control (C2 ) 
failures. Each of these requires additional elaboration. 
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a. Fire and Maneuver Control Failures 
The senior ground commander is responsible for all 
fire support delivered on surface targets within his area of 
responsibility. Doctrinal fire support coordination measures 
are intended to safeguard friendly forces and speed up the 
destruction of targets. Permissive coordination measures 
indicate that no further coordination is required to engage 
the affected targets. Restrictive measures, in contrast, rely 
on specific requests for coordination before the engagement of 
targets affected by the measure. Restrictive measures are an 
important way to avoid fratricide by regulating the employment 
of all supporting arms. 
The decisive application of combat power also 
requires commanders to convey their orders and intent to 
subordinates accurately and quickly. In prolonged combat, 
however, the commander and his staff are usually stretched to 
their limits. A fast-paced environment provides countless 
opportunities for human errors to develop, which may 
eventually lead to friendly-fire casualties. Many self-
inflicted casualties can be attributed to one or more 
conditions: flaws in mission planning; improper distribution 
of fire support and maneuver control measures; lack of 
understanding by subordinates; and failures in mission 
execution. 
Flaws in mission planning often result when military 
headquarters are careless in their approach to the combat 
decision-making process. Vital information may be unavailable 
or overlooked during the plan development phase. If no one 
detects and remedies these flaws in time, critical problems 
may develop. For example, plans that allow forces to converge 
without adequate controls are recipes for disaster. Similarly, 
plans that improperly task supporting arms or disperse units 
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along greater than doctrinal frontages may reduce the 
effectiveness of doctrinal fire and maneuver control efforts. 
Current doctrine also demands rapid and frequent changes to 
combat plans, which may result in the improper distribution of 
fire support and maneuver control measures. The combat 
environment is often in a state of flux that provides fleeting 
opportunities to seize the initiative and shape the course of 
events. To ensure unity of effort and take advantage of these 
opportunities, the commander must be able to distribute his 
plans and orders in a complete, timely, and accurate manner. 
All units must receive the commander's operational 
plan with sufficient lead time to allow concurrent planning, 
preparation, and execution. Unfortunately, there are countless 
reasons why orders may fail to reach units. As a result, some 
friendly units may be out of touch with the changing situation 
or unaware of fire support control measures currently in 
effect. Under such conditions, units may inadvertently stray 
into "hot" zones or free fire areas where they are almost 
certain to suffer casualties from friendly-fire. 
Lack of understanding by subordinates can easily 
lead to fire and maneuver control failures. The commander and 
his staff must attempt to create operational plans and orders 
that are simple to understand and easy to carry out. One way 
to ensure clarity and understanding is to employ a 
standardized system of military symbols and decision graphics 
that accurately identify objects of operational interest. An 
individual's level of understanding can also be enhanced 
through realistic walk-through rehearsals and commander's 
backbriefs. 
Failures in mission execution have a high potential 
to cause friendly-fire casualties, especially during offensive 
operations. The execution phase marks the critical transition 
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from plans and concepts to actual operations against the 
enemy. By the execution phase, all friendly elements should be 
fully integrated into the commander's scheme of maneuver and 
functioning like a well-oiled machine. 
One reason that some units fail to carry out 
assigned missions is simple, "friction." Clausewitz described 
friction as "the only concept which in a general way 
corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on 
paper. " 18 Friction is that element in war, separate from enemy 
action, that militates against the success of the commander's 
plan. l 9 It is the epitome of Murphy's Law, because simple 
details always seem to go wrong at the worst possible moment 
whenever military units try to communicate, move, or fight. 
The effects of friction are inevitable and 
ubiquitous. Many combatants fail to accomplish their assigned 
missions because they simply cannot overcome the effects of 
mental or physical friction. Their failures disrupt operations 
by creating even more friction that impedes the commander's 
plan of action. Friction lowers performance levels to the 
point where seemingly simple functions may become too 
difficult to carry out. High levels of friction may create 
circumstances that are conducive to the loss of situational 
awareness and hence to fratricide. 
For example, forward air controllers (FACs) rely 
extensively on two-way communications to control tactical 
aircraft. Lost or degraded communications between the FAC and 
supporting aircrew can easily result in disorientation and the 
complete loss of situational awareness. When this occurs, the 
18 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 164. 
19 Robert Leonhard, The Art ofManeuver: Maneuver Warfare Themy and AirLand Battle 
(Novato: Presidio Press, 1991), 242. 
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mission may have to be aborted because of the FACs inability 
to coordinate mission parameters and the extremely high risk 
of fratricide. A clear example of fratricide's secondary 
effects, stemming from fear, and not from actual friendly 
casualties. 
Fire and maneuver control failures are key 
contributors to the occurrence of friendly-fire incidents. 
Measures that are well planned and implemented provide 
safeguards for friendly forces and ensure responsive and 
accurate delivery of fires from supporting agencies. To reduce 
the danger of fratricide, fire and maneuver control measures 
must be understood and consistently applied. Unfortunately, 
errors in their application often result in execution failures 
between supporting arms and ground maneuver elements. 
b. Navigation Failures 
The U.S. military employs state of the art 
instruments to reduce navigational problems. Despite the use 
of these devices, individuals and units may become lost 
because they overlook basic navigational methods and 
techniques. Why do people sometimes get lost in the field? 
Navigation during combat should never be viewed as a matter of 
simply going from point A to point B. Tactical navigation is 
a complex and highly perishable skill that requires constant 
training and attention to detail. 
Once situational awareness is lost, individuals or 
units may stray out of assigned sectors, employ fire support 
weapons from improper locations, or erroneously report their 
position to higher headquarters. 20 These shortfalls may create 
situations where friendly units collide unexpectedly or engage 
20 U.S. Army, Combined Arms Co~and, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fratricide: 
Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses, CALL Newsletter 92-4 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April1992), 
10. 
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each other by mistake. As fluid situations develop, 
navigational errors may compound at each level of command, 
resulting in a progressively distorted "picture" of the 
battlefield. 
c. Command and Control Failures 
No single activity in war is more important than 
C2 • 21 By itself, C2 does not shoot down enemy airplanes, put 
Marines across the beach, or ensure that front-line units get 
resupplied. However, none of these vital functions would be 
possible without effective C2 • In joint and combined 
operations, C2 is defined in the following manner: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces 
in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and 
control functions are performed through an arrangement 
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 
and procedures employed by a commander in planning, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and 
operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 22 
The C2 process is the commander's principal way of 
cutting through the "fog of war" to reduce uncertainty and 
enhance collective situational awareness. One must 
nevertheless be aware of the degree to which information 
flows, even under the most sophisticated C2 system. For 
example, a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) 
monitoring air operations from a C2 facility may be tempted to 
believe that he can "control" all theater air activities. For 
the JFACC, the illusion of control can be very captivating, 
especially when subordinates fuse multiple sources of real 
21 Department of the Navy, Command and Control. A U.S. Marine Corps Concept Paper 
(Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1996), 19. 
22 U.S. Department ofDefense, Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionazy ofMilitaty and 
Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 82. 
19 
time and near-real time information to provide a 
"comprehensive picture" of the environment. Armed with a god's 
eye view of the airspace, the JFACC may be inclined to believe 
the air situation to be "well in hand" or "completely under 
control." Yet, how could this be possible if the JFACC never 
exercises precise "control" over variables like the thoughts 
and actions of friendly pilots, the weather, friction, and of 
course, the enemy? 
Commanders never have "control" in the strict sense 
of the term. Combat is far too complex and unpredictable to 
ever allow operations to unfold with such precision and ease. 
Military leaders must be receptive to the idea that effective 
C2 does not require all actions and decisions to be tightly 
controlled. The tempo and complexity of modern combat 
precludes the use of such a narrow approach. An effective C2 
process compensates for the inherent uncertainty of warfare. 
The ideal approach to C2 emphasizes simplicity, flexibility, 
and decentralization as opposed to micro-management, 
centralization, and the absence of feedback. In such a system, 
the commander commands with a loose rein--command by 
influence--allowing subordinates significant freedom of action 
and requiring them to act with sound judgement and 
initiative. 23 It should be noted, however, while this C2 
philosophy is desired in principle, it also carries a 
proportionally higher risk of fratricide. 
For example, commanders, leaders and their command 
posts may not generate timely, accurate, and complete reports 
or track subordinates as locations and the tactical situation 
23 Department of the Navy, Command and Control. A U.S. Marine Corps Concept Paper 
(Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1996), 54. 
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change. 24 As information passes through reporting channels it 
may become increasingly distorted and ambiguous until there is 
little correlation with the "real" combat environment. This is 
a dangerous situation that could easily result in the 
inadvertent clearance of supporting fires against friendly 
units. 
Decentralized C2 procedures can also break down when 
the tempo of operations strain organizational capabilities. 
Survival on today's battlefield calls for dispersal and 
frequent movement. Advancements in mobility, lethality, and 
information management continue to compress time and space, 
forcing higher operating tempos and creating an even greater 
demand for information. 25 Managing the sheer volume of 
information can overwhelm the C2 architecture, leading to 
systemic failures from over complexity. Developing an 
effective C2 architecture is one of the most important steps 
that a commander can take to reduce friendly-fire and 
establish some measure of order. 
The inability to gain and maintain situational 
awareness is one of the primary reasons for the occurrence of 
fratricide. Many fratricides occur as a direct result of 
failures in fire and maneuver control, navigation, and C
2
• 
There is no question that the loss of situational awareness 
accounts for many friendly casualties and a large portion of 
the total fratricide problem. Another major source of self-
inflicted casualties comes from critical shortfalls in the 
target identification process. 
24 U.S. Army, Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fratricide: 
Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses, CALL Newsletter 92-4 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April1992), 
10. 
25 Department of the Navy, Command and Control. A U.S. Marine Corps Concept Paper 
(Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1996), 40. 
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B. Target Identification Failures and Fratricide 
1. Who Goes There? 
Combat forces require positive, timely, and accurate 
identification of friends, foes, and neutrals. The advanced 
technologies of the modern battlefield have complicated the 
fratricide problem exponentially. Today, a great disparity 
exists between the range of modern weapon systems and the 
resolution of optical, thermal, and radar sensors. For 
instance, the process of identifying ground combat systems 
and troop formations remains largely visual (or "aided 
visual"). The range at which identification can be 
accomplished by these techniques, relative to optimum weapons 
firing range, is marginal in daylight and completely 
inadequate at night or when visibility is limited. 
Targets can be acquired and engaged at long range, but 
they cannot be positively identified at long range. Massed, 
high tempo operations on a nonlinear battlefield further 
complicate identification and force protection measures. The 
growing imbalance between weapons and their target 
identification capabilities do not support emerging air-land 
doctrines. This presents many problems for U.S. military 
forces. For example, identification shortfalls may lead to 
highly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), the inability to 
exploit range and lethality advantages of high technology 
systems, and the unraveling of politically sensitive 
Coalitions because of the detrimental effects of fratricide. 
Target identification refers to the capability for 
immediate, positive identification of forces as either 
friendly, hostile, or unknown. 26 There are several kinds of 
26 Brian K. Hughes, "Combat Identification Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration," paper presented at the Naval Postgraduate School Joint Service Combat 
Identification Systems Conference, Monterey, CA (14-16 November 1995), 297. 
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information used to identify combat forces. Identification at 
the allegiance level determines the hostile, friendly, or 
neutral status of a target. Identification at the class level 
differentiates between classes of targets such as "jet" versus 
"helicopter." Finally, identification at the platform type 
reports a specific target designation, such as MIG-29 Fighter 
or T-72 Main Battle Tank. 27 
Different tactical situations require different levels of 
target identification. For example, a pilot flying a CAS 
mission requires allegiance information at a minimum. Air 
battle managers on a carrier battle group may require specific 
class and platform information to defend the carrier. Most of 
the information needed for positive target identification is 
derived from multiple sources that include direct and indirect 
means, active and passive means, and cooperative and non-
cooperative techniques. A "direct" system is one in which the 
shooter collects the information about a target, while an 
"indirect" system is one where another observer collects the 
information. 28 The direct system has the advantage of immediacy 
since the shooter usually processes the target information 
himself. 
Passive observers and targets may also be distinguished 
as either active or passive. Passive observers do not transmit 
any energy themselves but only collect energy normally 
transmitted or reflected from a target. Similarly, a passive 
target only reflects energy from its environment and does not 
transmit its own energy. Thus, an abandoned tank on the 
27 U.S. Department ofDefense, Office of the Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition 
and Technology) Combat Identification Task Force Architecture Working Group Final Report 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 1-5. 
28 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 39. 
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battlefield merely reflects incident energy (sunlight, heat, 
etc.) but is unable to generate any of its own (i.e., radio 
transmissions, movement, and internal heat generation). An 
active observer transmits energy at the target so that it can 
be observed. 29 A good example of this would be an air defense 
unit that uses fire control radars to "sample" intermittent or 
ambiguous target returns. An active target is one that 
transmits its own energy, typically as electromagnetic 
signals. An AWACS platform is an active target since it 
generates an easily detectable electronic signature whenever 
it performs its air surveillance and C2 mission. 
Cooperative and non-cooperative techniques obtain 
information on friendly units with the aid of some form of 
response from the friendly unit. 30 In these systems, a target 
responds to or performs some action to identify itself to a 
sensor attempting identification. One of the most widely used 
cooperative techniques is the identification friend or foe 
(IFF) system found on most military aircraft. An IFF beacon 
system is similar to radar except that the return signal is 
radiated from a transmitter on board the target rather than 
being a reflection. 31 Thus, the beacon system operates with. a 
cooperative "active" target, while the radar operates with a 
"passive" target. 
In an IFF beacon system, a ground-based transmitter 
usually initiates the identification sequence (interrogator) 
29 Ibid, 30. 
30 U.S. Department ofDefense, Office ofthe Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition 
and Technology) Combat Identification Task Force Architecture Working Group Final Report 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 2-1. 
31 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, Basic Radar 
Principles, (Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, August 1995), 5-3. 
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that sends a coded signal to any aircraft of unknown identity. 
Aboard friendly aircraft, pulses from the interrogator trigger 
a combined receiver/transmitter (transponder) to reply by 
transmitting a coded signal back to the ground station. The 
interrogator then receives and processes this signal to obtain 
target range, azimuth, and identity status. IFF systems 
complement radar capabilities by providing a means not only to 
detect but identify targets. 
IFF systems cannot determine whether an improper or 
negative response indicates a hostile track, operator error, 
or equipment malfunction. This suggests that cooperative 
systems are nothing more than friend identifiers, since they 
do not positively identify enemy targets. If no reply is 
received, the shooter may assume that the target is the enemy 
but perhaps it is a neutral or a friend without an operating 
transponder. 32 Combat aircraft may launch with incorrect IFF 
codes or they might sustain battle damage that makes the IFF 
subsystem inoperable. IFF systems are sensitive electronic 
devices that are susceptible to damage, enemy exploitation, 
and human error. All these factors may contribute to steep 
fratricide rates in a high air threat environment. 
Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR) systems are 
designed to obtain identification information from emission 
signatures (such as aural, optical, or electromagnetic 
emissions) of friendly and hostile units. 33 Most systems are 
fully automated, in the sense that identification declarations 
are determined via computer processing; but several, such as 
32 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 42. 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition 
and Technology) Combat Identification Task Force Architecture Working Group Final Report 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 2-1. 
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electro-optic or other IR systems are non-automated. 34 NCTR 
systems are of great value to friendly forces because of their 
unique capabilities against hostile targets, especially those 
encountered during air operations. The main advantage NCTR 
systems offer is that targets can be passive and need not 
perform any actions or respond to identify themselves (like 
IFF) to sensors or weapons attempting identification. 
Non-cooperative identification varies from the very 
simple--visual recognition--to detection, analysis, and 
classification based on extremely subtle differences among 
targets. 35 The majority of all NCTR systems are employed for 
the detection and identification of aerial targets. Effective 
ground applications are still many years away. The primary 
sensors currently available for the detection of ground 
targets are non-automated, and consist almost entirely of 
electro-optical systems. 36 The major non-cooperative techniques 
used by the U.S. military to detect and identify friendly and 
hostile targets include: 
• Visual I Outward Appearance. The examination of 
physical traits and characteristics such as 
markings, size, color, shape, and telltale 
signatures. For example, Stinger Gunners must be 
able to detect, recognize, and identify small 
aerial objects at long ranges. Without early 
warning information, they rely on in-depth training 
about aircraft characteristics, tactics, and 
tell tale signatures (i.e., noise from helicopter 
blades, vapor trails from jets, or fin-flashes). 
Visual detection can be problematic, especially 
34 Ibid, 2-2. 
35 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 50. 
36 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition 
and Technology) Combat Identification Task Force Architecture Working Group Final Report 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 2-5. 
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when factors like terrain, climate, obscuration, 
and angle of view may complicate identification 
efforts. Furthermore, visual identification is a 
perishable skill that requires constant training 
emphasis. One of the difficulties with visual 
identification is that many targets look alike in a 
combat environment. For instance, an untrained 
observer could easily misidentify the U.S. A-10 
Thunderbolt for a Russian SU-25 Frogfoot since both 
aircraft are similar in appearance and design. 
• Radio-Emission Intercept. This refers to the 
passive interception of radio and radar 
transmissions. 37 This technique is based on the fact 
that all radio and radar systems have unique 
modulation signals that may be used for 
identification purposes. Systems that friendly 
forces may exploit include navigation systems, air 
traffic control systems, radar altimeter systemi, 
and IFF systems. In theory, radio-emission 
intercept systems provide a "fingerprint" of 
individual platform emitters that can be catalogued 
in a signal library to provide prompt and accurate 
identification information. 
• Radar. The detailed analysis of radar returns 
reveals much more about a target than just its 
bearing, range, and altitude. 38 For instance, high 
resolution radars may be employed to identify 
particular structures on targets such as leading 
wing edges and jet engine nacelles. 39 One unique 
target identification system that may have 
practical applicability in the future is Jet Engine 
Modulation (JEM). In this technique, active systems 
are employed to analyze the Doppler frequency shift 
of radar signals reflected from the compressor 
blades of jet engines. Conceptually the idea has 
merit but a major shortfall is that JEM identifies 
engines and not specific aircraft. The difficulty 
is that there are a limited number of military jet 
37 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 50. 
38 Ibid, 51. 
39 Ibid, 51. 
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engines available worldwide and a whole spectrum of 
aircraft that can be powered by the same type of 
engine. 
• Electro-Optical Detectors. Electro-Optical (EO) 
sensors are normally employed by the military to 
determine the range, visual, and infrared (IR) 
signature of objects. 40 They are also useful for 
precision guidance weapons, fire control devices, 
navigation, and communications systems. EO 
detectors can be either active or passive depending 
on the system's application. Active EO systems 
consist of lasers, laser designators, and laser 
rangefinders while passive systems include night 
vision goggles (NVGs) and thermal imaging systems 
like forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensors. Most 
active systems are employed to provide accurate 
range, azimuth, and elevation information that can 
be used to locate and identify friendly and hostile 
targets. On the other hand, passive systems are 
very important to combat units that must fight in 
varying light and weather conditions. NVGs are EO 
image intensification devices used to detect 
visible and near-IR energy, intensify that energy, 
and provide a visible image to the user at night. 41 
While NVGs are extremely useful, they do have 
limitations that affect target identification such 
as a narrow field of view and a short focal range. 
FLIR sensors provide target acquisition and 
tracking capabilities in low-visibility conditions 
and at night. 42 Like NVGs, FLIR systems have 
considerable military utility but their use must be 
balanced against the limitations of target 
identification at maximum FLIR detection ranges. 
Cooperative and non-cooperative target identification 
systems allow military forces to operate safely day or night, 
and under adverse field conditions. Both techniques are 
40 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, Introduction 
to Laser Radiation, (Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, August 1995), 6. 
41 Ibid, VI. 
42 Department ofthe Army, FM 44-31 Tactics. Techniques. and Procedures for Avenger 
Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Army, 1990), F-3. 
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complementary and enhance the target acquisition and 
identification process. In particular, the battlefield 
integration of NCTR systems provides a real force multiplier 
because positive identification of both friendly and hostile 
targets is vital to the engagement process. Effectively using 
NCTR techniques allows combat units to maximize their beyond 
visual range (BVR) weapons, while reducing the risks of 
fratricide. NCTR systems are critically important in 
circumstances when the rules of engagement (ROE) do not permit 
friendly units to fire unless there has been a positive 
indication that the contact is hostile as is normal in most 
combat operations. Understanding how the ROE fit into the 
target identification and engagement process is a critically 
important dimension of all fratricide avoidance efforts. 
Unsurprisingly, U.S. forces prefer to operate in 
environments where the ROE can be permissive rather than 
restrictive in nature. The permissive environment offers the 
best opportunities to maximize the range and killing potential 
of most U.S. combat systems. Political limitations coupled 
with the absence of a reliable means to positively identify 
targets will often force the ROE to be restrictive. 
2. Modalities of Target Identification Failure 
The fact that U.S. forces cannot positively identify 
targets in all dimensions and conditions explains a great deal 
about the occurrence of fratricide. Though each friendly-fire 
incident results from a complex and unique set of variables, 
those directly attributed to target identification failures 
are often characterized by the inability to distinguish 
visual, thermal, or optical signatures, limited visibility or 
restricted terrain, and similarities between friendly and 
enemy equipment. 
29 
a. The Inability to Distinguish Visual, 
Thermal, or Optical Signatures 
Most target identifications in battle are made 
visually. This poses a major problem for U.S. forces which can 
acquire and kill targets beyond visual range but cannot 
identify them except through close-in, visual techniques. 
Potential adversaries must often be allowed to penetrate into 
friendly held areas before positive identification can be 
made. Today's thermal imaging and targeting systems have the 
capacity to acquire targets well in excess of 4,000 meters but 
positive identification is usually limited to approximately 
1,200 meters. 43 This obviously reduces combat efficiency and 
jeopardizes friendly units who may be inside the effective 
envelope of enemy weapon systems before positive 
identification is made. 
The visual identification of ground targets takes on 
new meaning for pilots flying CAS missions, especially at 
night or under adverse weather conditions. High speed survival 
tactics coupled with the employment of area weapons greatly 
reduces target acquisition and identification times. This 
makes accurate surface deliveries highly problematic and 
risky. One recognized expert on the subject of fratricide, 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Schrader USA (Ret), summarized the 
problem when he noted that "it is too much to hope that a 
pilot, diving at 600 m.p.h. through smoke while taking evasive 
action and attempting to deliver area-type ordnance 
accurately, could instantaneously and correctly identify 
camouflaged friendly ground troops making maximum use of 
43 U.S. Army, Armor Training Center Video, Fratricide Awareness and Prevention, (Fort 
Knox, Kentucky, 1992). 
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available cover and concealment.n 44 The harsh reality is that 
pilots do not have the time or the tools to identify targets 
during their final attack run. 
To offset these complications, FACs typically employ 
IR pointers, beacons, lasers, and flares to mark friendly 
positions and/ or designate hostile targets. Effective CAS 
missions also require airborne platforms that are compatible 
with the systems used by ground observers. Most U.S. close 
support aircraft are equipped with lasers or laser receivers, 
radar, FLIR, and GPS devices for position location. While 
these systems offer many advantages, they also suffer some 
major limitations. For instance, reduced illumination levels 
caused by the moon phase, weather, or battlefield obscuration 
degrades the ability of human operators to employ night vision 
devices (NVDs) without artificial illumination. 45 When 
improperly employed, NVDs can easily lead to disorientation, 
vertigo, and the loss of situational awareness. These 
conditions may have deadly implications for friendly units 
near the target area. 
At close-in ranges, visual recognition training 
becomes a critical step in the shooter's decision to engage a 
target or not. Threat recognition skills, especially for 
thermal images, are highly perishable and subject to errors in 
human perception and interpretation. In battle, these 
shortfalls may easily lead shooters to fire first and identify 
later, often as a result of anxiety and repetitive training 
that cultivates automatic and conditioned responses. 
44 Geoffrey Regan, Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire (New York: Avon Books, 
1995), 137. 
45 U.S. Department ofDefense, Joint Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics. Techniques. and 
Procedures for Close Air Support, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 
IV-18. 
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To be proficient, operators must be able to exercise 
good judgement based on the recognition of subtle design 
differences among a wide-range of friendly and enemy combat 
systems. The difficulties of target identification are 
compounded when friendly and enemy systems are similar in 
appearance such as M-lAl and T-72 Main Battle Tanks. 
Obscuration and angle of view are additional factors that can 
mask or disguise many subtle characteristics thus making 
acquisition and identification more difficult. 
Dust from mechanized forces and indirect fires 
raises a curtain that significantly degrades thermal 
capabilities. 46 Fog and smoke can also impair thermal 
effectiveness as can fires and burning vehicles which cause 
thermal washout. These factors nullify some advantages offered 
by high technology weapons and create situations where 
friendly units in close contact can easily mistake each other 
for the enemy. 
b. Limited Visibility or Restricted Terrain 
Most target identifications in combat are made by 
visual means. This indicates that shooters like to see clearly 
and recognize targets before classifying them as friend or 
foe. Many fratricides have occurred because of identification 
difficulties posed by terrain and climatic conditions. While 
these same conditions may be used for battlefield advantage, 
they can also hamper operations by obscuring views and 
restricting visibility thus making target identification 
uncertain. 
Many natural and man -made events influence 
visibility on the battlefield. Darkness and the effects of 
46 U.S. Army, Armor Training Center Video, Fratricide Awareness and Prevention, (Fort 
Knox, Kentucky, 1992). 
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weather are among the most important factors governing the 
conduct of all military operations. Low clouds, fog, haze, and 
precipitation may restrict visibility for extended periods and 
cover vast geographic areas. Even bright sunlight can hinder 
visibility under some conditions, as often happens when ground 
or air units attack with the sun at their backs. 
The ability of units to see each other in the field 
can also be limited by the effects of man-made factors like 
smog, smoke, illumination, and camouflage. Visibility was 
drastically reduced during the ground war phase of Operation 
Desert Storm because of the numerous oil-well fires 
intentionally set by the retreating Iraqi Army. Greasy smoke 
and soot from these fires combined with moisture to create an 
oily film that seriously degraded the performance of many 
thermal and optical devices. 
Mountains, deserts, jungles, and alpine environments 
present unique surroundings that may distort visibility and 
confound visual target identification. Mountainous areas are 
characterized by rugged, compartmented terrain with steep 
slopes and few natural or man-made lines of communication.
47 
High altitude effects can also make simple mental tasks 
difficult, decrease concentration, lead to memory loss and 
less vigilance, and impair critical judgement skills. 48 
Additionally, mountain operations often require the use of 
specialized protective clothing and equipment like face masks 
and goggles which further restrict visual acuity. 
Jungle environments also present many hazards and 
complications for military operations. Heavy rainfall and lush 
47 Department of the Army, FM 44-31 Tactics Techniques. and Procedures for Avenger 
Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Army, 1990), A-1. 
48 Department of the Army, FM 21-11 First Aid for Soldiers (Washington D.C.: 
Headquarters, U.S. Army, 1985), 57. 
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vegetation reduce visibility and restrict operations. The 
dense jungle provides excellent concealment for ground forces 
and makes observation and target identification difficult, if 
not impossible at times. This was one of the major problems 
U.S. forces experienced in Southeast Asia, which explains why 
defoliants were used extensively during that conflict. 
Desert operations also pose challenges that exact a 
heavy toll on military efficiency. Many people mistakenly 
believe that desert environments offer unrestricted 
visibility. Visibility is usually high but most desert regions 
experience suspended dust that can severely reduce visibility 
for hundreds of square miles. 49 Heat shimmers, blowing sand, 
and thunder storms further restrict visibility on the desert 
battlefield, which in turn, places a heavy burden on accurate 
target identification. During Operation Desert Storm dust, 
smoke, and darkness often aided Coalition forces by shielding 
them from enemy observation. These same battlefield conditions 
also impaired the sighting systems used by many Coalition 
members. 
Sorting out friends and foes by visual means becomes 
nearly impossible when visibility is poor or terrain is 
restrictive. Though U.S. forces routinely train to standards 
where poor visibility and difficult terrain are givens, in 
actual combat these dynamic factors work to conceal forces and 
degrade target identification efforts. Unfortunately, most 
U.S. target identification systems remain very sensitive to 
battlefield degradation, as well as to the inevitable 
shortcomings of human operators. 
49 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of 
U.S. Foreign Policy, (new York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 128. 
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c. Similarities Between Friendly and Enemy 
Equipment 
Few things complicate the target identification and 
engagement sequence more than the presence of identical or 
similar combat systems among friendly, neutral, and hostile 
forces. Uncertainty about the friendly or hostile character of 
targets can easily create widespread confusion, indecision, 
and the loss of aggressiveness during fire and maneuver. This 
is not a new problem. Similarities between friendly and enemy 
combat systems have plagued battlefield target identification 
efforts for years. The fact that many American weapons are 
sold or reproduced throughout the world makes it likely that 
U.S. forces will one day have to fight an adversary equipped 
with virtually identical combat systems. The process of 
sorting out friends and foes has also become much more 
involved in recent years because of greater emphasis on 
multinational operations. 
Alliance and Coalition operations are among the most 
complex and demanding of all military activities. To organize 
a Coalition, political and military leaders must achieve unity 
of purpose and interoperability among all the members. 
Coalitions are often brittle organizations that are 
susceptible to disjointed command relationships, poor 
cooperative planning, and fears about sharing technology and 
information. These factors may lead to organizational strife, 
higher political and military risk, and even the unraveling of 
the Coalition. 
Coalitions differ from Alliances in that they tend 
to be ad-hoc arrangements for common action, usually for 
single occasions and for narrowly defined sectors of common 
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interest. 50 The absence of habitual working relationships, C2 
differences, and the diversity of individual partners explains 
why force integration and target identification efforts among 
Coalition forces are often so intense. 
For example, Operation Desert Storm was fought by 
one of the most diverse Coalitions in history. Apart from U.S. 
forces, Coalition partners included the British, French, 
Italians, Saudis, Syrians, Kuwaitis, and Egyptians to name 
only the most prominent "junior partners." One of the major 
concerns that surfaced during the build-up phase of the 
operation was that some Coalition members operated equipment 
that was identical to that of the Iraqi military. While this 
obviously created problems, it should not have come as a great 
surprise to the Coalition's leadership since Iraq was one of 
the top arms importers in the world. 
From the onset of the Gulf crisis, Coalition 
planners struggled to discriminate between friendly and enemy 
combat vehicles, aircraft, and IFF techniques. Many innovative 
techniques like inverted "V" markings on vehicles and non 
doctrinal "kill boxes" were used to simplify targeting and 
reduce the hazards of Coalition fratricide. The kill boxes 
were nothing more than geographically defined areas used to 
facilitate the destruction of enemy targets of opportunity. 
All surface targets inside the designated areas were presumed 
hostile. The permissive nature of the kill boxes maximized the 
range capabilities of many U.S. weapons and drastically cut 
down fratricide risk. The concept worked well largely because 
Iraq's lackluster performance produced little intermixing of 
forces, but it still placed a heavy burden on Coalition forces 
to navigate properly and maintain effective C2 • 
50 U.S. Department ofDefense, Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary ofMilitary and 
Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 75. 
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Though the Gulf War may have been an extreme 
example, the fact remains that the ability to identify targets 
declines whenever friendly and enemy forces possess armaments 
that are similar in design. Spiraling arms sales and security 
transfers to Third World countries have only made the 
likelihood of encountering these systems in the future worse. 
The appearance of .similarly equipped combatants adds one more 
layer of complexity and uncertainty to military operations. 
Clearly, it is in the interests of the U.S. to help Allies and 
Coalition partners avoid fratricidal attacks on themselves or 
on U.S. forces. Unfortunately, the need to strike a balance 
between the protection of identification techniques and mutual 
collaboration creates dilemmas, especially when today's ad-hoc 
partner might become tomorrow's adversary. 51 
The absence of positive target identification 
coupled with the inability to maintain situational awareness 
are two of the most important reasons for fratricide. Having 
accurate, real time knowledge about the combat environment 
helps friendly forces reduce the likelihood of fratricidal 
exchanges from failures in fire and maneuver control, 
navigation, and C2 • 
Instances of mistaken identity and the loss of 
situational awareness point to the fact that human operators 
are the weak link in the fratricide prevention chain. If this 
premise holds true, then fratricide rates may continue to 
climb as the tempo and complexity of warfare increases. While 
fratricide may occur under all battlefield conditions, it may 
be more prevalent in highly fluid, fast moving, offensive 
operations. This creates major problems for maneuver oriented 
militaries because the same warfare concepts that disorient 
51 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 44. 
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the enemy may prove equally, if inadvertently effective among 
friendly troops. 
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III. EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS IN AIR-LAND FRATRICIDE 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF MILITARY AVIATION 
The first military use of gas filled balloons was by the 
Army of the Potomac during the American Civil War. Early in 
the war, the Union Army employed balloons to observe enemy 
troop movements, find entrenchments, spot for artillery, and 
develop maps. 52 Although Union forces employed balloons during 
several major campaigns, their use was largely abandoned 
before the war's end because of competing demands and a lack 
of operational interest. Despite their obvious limitations, 
balloons represented a major technological breakthrough that 
prompted further exploration into long-range aerial 
reconnaissance of the battlefield. 
Airships, like the German Zeppelins, were another 
technical refinement of the evolving air warfare concept, but 
the arrival of the faster and more maneuverable airplane 
quickly overshadowed their combat utility. Orville and Wilbur 
Wright's successful airplane flight on December 17, 1903 
changed the course of modern warfare. However, the airplane's 
full potential remained largely unrecognized for several 
years. Military leaders only thought of it as the airborne 
eyes of the Army. By 1910, Americans and Europeans recognized 
that the airplane might revolutionize battle by conducting 
air-to-ground combat. 53 
In 1911, Italy became the first country to use the 
airplane in war when 2d Lt. Giulio Gavotti of the Squadriglia 
52 Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modem Warfare 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 53. 
53 Richard P. Hallion, Strike From the Sky: The Histocy ofBattlefield Air Attack 1911-
1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 11. 
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di Tripoli dropped four small bombs from his airplane during 
fighting in Tripoli against the Turks. 54 The Italians continued 
to employ these simple bombing tactics for the rest of the 
campaign with minimal effect. Nevertheless, military 
organizations soon came to realize that by mounting bombs and 
adapting machine guns for aerial warfare, they could enhance 
the capabilities of the airplane. Although military aircraft 
were mostly unarmed at the start of World War I, all of the 
major combatants had at least experimented with the airplane 
for both reconnaissance and ground attack. 
B . WORLD WAR I 
The First World War was a conflict that few wanted, but 
which quickly grew beyond the ability of governments to 
contain. 55 It was characterized by military organizations that 
used innovative technologies like tanks, submarines, and of 
course, airplanes. When the Germans launched their offensive 
in 1914, they hoped to achieve a quick and decisive victory by 
outmaneuvering the Allies. Years earlier, German planners had 
anticipated a two-front war against France and Russia. To 
employ their forces decisively, Germany developed the 
Schlieffen Plan that aimed to hold the Russians in check with 
minimum force while the bulk of the German Army crushed 
France, deemed the more dangerous enemy. Had the plan been 
carried out as originally conceived, Germany may have ended 
the war quickly and decisively. 
However, the ambitious German strategy failed for various 
reasons, including some critical changes made to the original 
plan by General Helmuth von Mol tke (who did not want to 
violate Dutch neutrality) and communication and logistic 
54 Ibid, 11. 
ss Ibid, 13. 
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inefficiencies. The initial German failure to outmaneuver the 
Allied nations ended the possibility of a quick victory, 
especially since the Allies were in a better position to wage 
a protracted conflict. Thus, a stalemate developed on the 
Western Front that was characterized by static trench warfare 
and constant, bloody attempts by all parties to restore a war 
of mobility and maneuver. 
During the initial phases of the war, military leaders 
still focused on the reconnaissance aspects of air power. As 
the war progressed, however, the major powers sought to 
exploit the broader potential of the airplane. A great deal of 
attention was focused on air power to learn how it could be 
harnessed in a ground attack role against a static enemy. A 
critical problem affecting the quality of air support appeared 
that still continues today: poor communications and 
integration between the air and land forces. 56 Air-land 
communications during the war were primitive, to say the 
least. Pilots relied on ground units to use flares, smoke 
signals, lights, and colored panel markers to mark their 
positions, while ground forces waited for pilots to drop 
written messages down to them or use other prearranged 
signals. 
The static nature of the war nevertheless made it 
possible to get by with such primitive air-land 
communications. Except at night or when the weather was bad, 
the massive trench system dividing the European countryside 
provided a reliable means of distinguishing one's own troops 
from those of the enemy. 57 The linear nature of the battlefield 
56 Ibid, 21. 
57 Martin van Creveld, Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S. Brower, Air Power and 
Maneuver Warfare (Montgomery: Air University Press, 1994), 25. 
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markedly increased the risk of aerial fratricide. 
Toward the end of the war, however, the tactical 
stalemate on the ground finally gave way to large-scale mobile 
operations, which quickly shifted the battlefront. 58 These 
changes complicated CAS procedures, making aerial fratricide 
more likely. Significant problems were experienced with air-
land integration, target identification, and tactical 
communications. While air power could be concentrated more 
rapidly than even a few years before, it could not easily be 
used on a battlefield with which the pilots were unfamiliar, 
or one on which the battle lines were shifting or 
fluctuating. 59 In this war, the inadequacies of air-land 
doctrines and the limits of technology were too great to allow 
effective CAS on a changing and fast-moving battlefield. 
Overall, air power played an important but limited role 
in the outcome of World War I. The war transformed the 
airplane from a limited reconnaissance platform into a full-
fledged instrument of modern combat. The most significant 
problem with air power during this conflict was the poor 
integration between air operations, whether for reconnaissance 
or attack, and major ground offensives. Inadequate doctrines, 
primitive communications, and inexperience with tactical air 
operations created favorable conditions for the occurrence of 
many friendly-fire casualties during the last year of the war. 
Although the static nature of the conflict before then 
produced a low rate of aerial fratricide, the First World War 
was nevertheless a test bed for evolving air warfare concepts 
that were to become much more important in years to come. 
58 Benjamin F. Cooling, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 25. 
59 Ibid, 26. 
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C. WORLD WAR II 
By the time war came to Europe in 1939, each belligerent 
had equipped and trained its air services to perform clearly 
defined functions. The United States, Great Britain, and Italy 
emphasized the development of long-range strategic bombers 
while Germany, Russia, and Japan developed air forces to 
support army operations. When war broke out, the German 
Luftwaffe probably had the most integrated and effective close 
air support system of any of the great powers. For other 
belligerents, the first campaigns of the war revealed serious 
doctrinal and procedural weaknesses in this area. 60 
1. The German Concept of Air-Land Warfare 
World War Two began on September 1, 1939 when Germany 
unleashed the full fury of the Blitzkrieg against Poland. 
Within two weeks, 
closed around the 
surrounded most 
the massive German pincer movement that 
capital of Warsaw had either destroyed or 
Polish forces. The Wehrmacht achieved 
similarly decisive and quick results in Western Europe during 
1940 as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France were 
knocked out of the war in rapid succession. 
Germany's exceptional success in battle stemmed from the 
bold application of a new and innovative doctrine that 
emphasized sudden and coordinated attacks with armor, 
infantry, and tactical air power. Known as the Blitzkrieg, 
this approach to fighting aimed at breaking through an enemy's 
front line and penetrating his rear area as quickly as 
possible. 61 At the operational level, Blitzkrieg aimed to 
outmaneuver an enemy and attack his fragile and exposed 
60 Ibid, 56. 
61 Barry R. Posen The Sources of Military Doctrine:France. Britain. and Germany 
Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 206. 
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command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3 I) 
infrastructure. The stunning success of Germany's doctrine was 
possible because of the synergy achieved by the integrated 
employment of combined arms. Air support from the Luftwaffe 
played a vital role by establishing local air superiority, 
disrupting critical nodes, interdicting enemy lines of 
communications, and providing close support to ground maneuver 
elements. 
The initial German campaigns of World War II were not 
without faults. The application of Blitzkrieg doctrine was 
highly dependent on reliable communications. The Germans 
learned that high-speed, mobile warfare made it difficult to 
keep air command authorities informed of army movements on the 
battlefield. 62 To simplify communications and reduce the risk 
of fratricide, German forces used common air-land radio 
frequencies and employed liaison officers to enhance the flow 
of information between air and ground units. 
The use of liaison officers at major command levels was 
an important means of synchronizing efforts, enhancing 
situational awareness, and reducing fratricide. Liaison 
officers were crucial because fast-paced German units often 
moved beyond communications range or pre-briefed map 
boundaries. The use of smoke and clearly marked recognition 
devices were additional techniques used by the Germans to 
identify advancing troops in fluid situations. Despite the 
emphasis on fratricide prevention, serious incidents still 
occurred, especially during fast-paced, offensive operations. 
During the Polish campaign, for instance, the lOth Panzer 
Division was constantly machine gunned and bombed by German 
aircraft. One Luftwaffe attack left 13 soldiers dead and 25 
62 Benjamin F. Cooling, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 83. 
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badly wounded. This particular episode occurred despite the 
use of prearranged recognition devices by the ground troops.
63 
In a similar incident, a group of JU-87 Stuka dive-bombers 
attacked the 2nd Panzer Brigade at Querrieu, near Amiens. 64 To 
avoid losses to his armored units, General Heinz Guderian 
ordered his flak gunners to fire on the attacking German 
planes, eventually downing one of them. 
The Luftwaffe's record for providing tactical air support 
to fast-moving ground forces is mixed. While steps were taken 
to reduce fratricide, practical solutions to the problems of 






CAS to fast moving armored spearheads 
self-inflicted casualties through air 
The Germans recognized that air support operations worked 
well against static defensive positions but became more 
problematic during highly fluid situations. As in Poland, the 
Luftwaffe did not try to coordinate its missions with the 
racing armies but instead, flew against targets behind the 
front. The problem of distinguishing friend from foe and 
securing good air-to-ground cooperation was not so much solved 
as evaded. 65 
2. Anglo-American Views on Air-Land Warfare 
The six years of fighting on the battlefields of Western 
Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific account for most 
American and British air-land fratricides. The widespread use 
63 Ibid, 86. 
64 Geoffrey Regan, Blue on Blue: A Histozy of Friendly Fire (New York: Avon Books, 
1995), 142. 
65 Martin van Creveld, Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S. Brower, Air Power and 
Maneuver Warfare (Montgomery: Air University Press, 1994), 54. 
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of the airplane in nearly all combat settings coupled with 
dramatic increases in the lethality of weapons led to a sharp 
escalation in the total number of friendly-fire casualties. 
Contributing to this disturbing trend was the raging 
controversy over the role of air forces on the battlefield. In 
both the United States and Great Britain, air power advocates 
lobbied for the centralized control of all air assets for 
long-range strategic bombardment. Unfortunately, the obsession 
with strategic bombing of the enemy's heartland often meant 
that methods and techniques for conducting tactical missions 
like CAS remained crude. The absence of an efficient and 
responsive air C2 system reflects one of the key problems the 
Allies needed to overcome before they could effectively fight 
on land. 
From the outset of the war, the Royal Air Force (RAF) and 
the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) had many similar beliefs about 
the command and employment of air power in combat. After years 
of frustration and disagreement with ground commanders, the 
air services still maintained that land power and air power 
were coequal, independent forces; neither was an auxiliary of 
the other. 66 The RAF and USAAF also had corresponding views 
about the mission priori ties necessary to conduct an air 
campaign. The priorities of the air services were to gain air 
superiority, interdict troops and supplies, and finally, 
support ground forces in the battle area. 
Unlike the RAF, the USAAF had a much more difficult time 
separating itself from the problem of air-land integration 
because it was not a coequal and independent service like the 
RAF. Battlefield support for the army continued to be a source 
of great friction and rivalry between air and ground 
66 Richard P. Hallion, Strike From the Sky: The History ofBattlefield Air Attack 1911-
1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 173. 
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components. The harsh realities of the war forced both the RAF 
and the USAAF to develop more efficient tactical air support 
procedures by rewriting doctrine and streamlining air control 
procedures. In early 1942, the War Department published 
FM 31-35, "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces." 
This manual provided a tiered system to manage air assets 
and process army requests for air support. Air assets were 
divided into a series of support commands that were linked 
with specific ground maneuver units. The problem with this 
approach was that the network of aircraft, air support 
parties, liaison officers, control centers, and communications 
pathways were redundant, cumbersome, and awkward. The new 
system also violated the principles of mass and unity of 
effort by parceling out limited aviation assets to act as "air 
umbrellas" for division, corps, and army level commanders. 
The air C2 system was ineffective when used in combat. 
The problem stemmed from the inability of some commanders to 
integrate CAS in battle. It took the fiasco at Kasserine Pass 
in February 1943 to make the USAAF and the RAF realize that 
the Allied air C2 system was broken and in need of repair. FM-
31-35 was abandoned in favor of ad-hoc procedures for air-land 
coordination and control. In light of ~asserine, General 
Eisenhower assembled a study group of air and ground officers 
to examine the doctrinal implications and prepare a new draft 
field manual on air power. The result of this endeavor was a 
document that had a staggering impact on the future nature of 
Air Force--Army ground force relations: FM 100-20, "Command 
and Employment of Air Power. " 67 
FM-100-20 was a cooperative product between British and 
American officers to streamline the use of air-land forces. It 
67 Ibid, 172. 
47 
was an innovative doctrinal publication that spelled-out the 
relationships between air and ground commanders. The new 
doctrine affirmed the coequality of air and ground commanders 
in addition to standardizing theater air campaign procedures. 
The new doctrine helped integrate air-land operations by 
providing greater flexibility and unity of effort. It also 
reduced the piecemeal employment of air power. 
Years of jockeying over the roles and missions of air 
power had created many inefficiencies in the use of tactical 
air power. By redesigning the air CL system from the ground 
up, the Allies exploited their advantage in air power and 
reduced the likelihood of aerial fratricides. Transitioning to 
a new tactical air doctrine was time-consuming, and opposed by 
some Army ground commanders who believed their battlefield 
needs were not a priority for the air services. Unfortunately, 
many of the same problems with Allied air-land operations 
resulted in friendly-fire casual ties. This became readily 
apparent during the final campaigns in the Mediterranean and 
Western European theaters. 
During the Sicilian campaign USAAF A-36 Invaders 
repeatedly attacked elements of the 2nct Armored Division which 
were pursuing a retreating German Panzer division. Poor 
situational awareness and inadequate mission coordination 
resulted in misplaced bombs that claimed more than 75 friendly 
troops. During this campaign General Omar Bradley narrowly 
missed falling victim to an A-36, which dive-bombed and 
strafed him while he was visiting General Allen's 
headquarters. 68 In another instance, a fratricidal attack by 
a group of A-36 aircraft led to the loss of Monte Cipolla to 
the Germans. A small detachment of American infantrymen and 
68 Geoffrey Regan, Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire (New York: Avon Books, 
1995), 156. 
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artillerymen had been desperately battling the Germans when 
the A-36's bombed them, killing or wounding 19 men and forcing 
a retreat. 69 The Sicilian campaign was plagued by many of the 
traditional problems with CAS, namely poor communications, the 
loss of situational awareness by aircrews, difficulties 
identifying friendly ground forces, and procedural flaws with 
liaison officers and air control agencies. 
Several instances of air-land fratricide also occurred 
during the Italian campaign. The most notable incident was the 
U.S. heavy bomber strike at Monte Cassino. In this case, 
Allied pilots lost situational awareness and bombed the town 
of Venafro, which was 15 miles from the designated target area 
of Monte Cassino, causing the deaths of 57 soldiers and 
civilians. 70 This fratricidal engagement resulted from poor 
navigation and the use of heavy bombers in a direct support 
role. While the concept of using strategic bombers for CAS has 
some merit in theory, expecting bombers at 14,000 feet to have 
the accuracy needed for CAS was simply absurd in 1943. Another 
serious mishap occurred during the advance on Rome, when U.S. 
warplanes strafed several Allied columns inflicting hundreds 
of casualties. Again, poor C2 , the loss of situational 
awareness, and target misidentification resulted in many self-
inflicted casualties. 
In France, 1the initial success of the D-day amphibious 
and airborne landings soon gave way to frustration as 
geography and a tough German defense halted the expansion of 
the Normandy lodgement. By July, the delays led to the 
development of a breakout plan, code-named Operation Cobra. 
69 Richard P. Hallion, Strike From the Sky: The History ofBattlefield Air Attack 1911-
1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 178. 
70 Geoffrey Regan, Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire (New York: Avon Books, 
1995), 158. 
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The goal of this operation was to rupture the German lines 
with a heavy air bombardment. Confusion, poor situational 
awareness, and inadequate air-land coordination led to the 
bombing of U.S. ground positions, resulting in more than 150 
soldiers killed and nearly 800 wounded. 71 Among the friendly-
fire casualties was Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the 
senior Allied officer killed in Europe during the war, who was 
visiting the front lines to inspect the effectiveness of the 
bombing. 
Weeks after the friendly bombings in Normandy, the Allies 
conducted two more heavy bomber raids, code-named Totalize and 
Tractable. During Operation Totalize, the USAAF inflicted more 
than 300 casualties on Canadian and Polish mechanized units 
that were close to German defensive positions. One week later, 
RAF bombers flying in support of Operation Tractable dropped 
their ordnance on units from the Canadian 2nd Corps. This time, 
poor situational awareness by air-ground liaison officers, 
navigational error, and signal failures caused the bombing 
error that cost the Canadians 112 dead, 376 wounded, and more 
than 265 combat and combat support vehicles. 72 
Both incidents occurred even though Allied commanders had 
withdrawn friendly forces in anticipation of the airstrikes 
against the German positions. The cumulative fratricide counts 
for Operations Cobra, Totalize, and Tractable were appalling, 
nearly 2, 000 men killed and wounded. These high casualty 
figures convinced the Allies to stop using heavy bombers for 
CAS missions. Instead, medium bombers and fighter-bombers were 
used because they could deliver their ordnance with greater 
71 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign ofFrance and Germany. 
1944-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981 ), 153. 
72 RichardT. Bickers, Friendly Fire: Accidents in Battle from Ancient Greece to the Gulf 
War (London: Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., 1994), 126. 
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precision, and they did not need such a large safety zone. 73 
Allied ground forces experienced additional air-land 
fratricides before the war ended. Incidents at Malmedy and the 
Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge claimed many 
casualties. In nearly all cases, human error, poor situational 
awareness, and faulty target recognition by attacking aircrews 
were to blame. Fratricide became so common during operations 
in the European theater that many Allied ground units lost 
confidence in the ability of USAAF to provide safe and 
effective CAS and dubbed them the "American Luftwaffe. " 74 
D. SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Fighting an enemy with resolve and expertise in guerilla 
warfare is no simple process. It was made more difficult in 
I 
Southeast Asia by the fact that the Army and Air Force could 
not agree on matters relating to air-land combat integration. 
In Vietnam, the Army wanted to establish a decentralized air 
support system where the local ground commander received CAS 
to deal with targets in his area of responsibility. The Army 
wanted dedicated support because it feared that Air Force 
planes would be diverted for other missions, leaving ground 
units unsupported during battle. 
For its part, the Air Force maintained its traditional 
view that control of air power should be centralized at the 
theater level to enhance the effectiveness of the air 
campaign. The Air Force argued that in the fluid, rapidly 
changing circumstances of combat, battlefield priorities could 
shift quickly and unexpectedly. These sudden changes might 
73 Richard P. Hallion, Strike From the Sky: The History ofBattlefield Air Attack 1911-
1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 224. 
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require the concentration of CAS resources at the expense of 
denying support to ground units less heavily engaged. 75 The 
conflicting views of the two Services fueled traditional 
rivalries and impaired the combat efficiency of air-land 
forces in Vietnam. 
Two critical air support issues further divided the 
Services: the Army's new airmobile concept, and the evolving 
battlefield role of the helicopter. The airmobile concept was 
an offshoot of the Army's preparation for ground combat 
against Soviet forces. The idea was to use light airmobile 
units to outmaneuver the enemy and destroy him through highly 
fluid engagements. The only way to make this concept work was 
to use large numbers of helicopters to provide the necessary 
lift, flexibility, and battlefield mobility. During the Korean 
War the Marines had proven the utility of the helicopter, and 
as the build-up for Vietnam went into high gear, the Army 
followed suit by obtaining large numbers of helicopters for 
transport and logistical duties. 
Throughout this period, the Air Force voiced concerns 
that the Army was creating its own organic air arm to compete 
for CAS resources. Air Force suspicions grew when the Army 
started arming helicopters. The concept of helicopters armed 
with offensive weapons was very popular with the Army and 
Marine Corps, who employed them to carry out escort, aerial 
cavalry, "search and destroy," and CAS missions. The attack 
helicopter quickly became the aerial weapon of choice for 
ground commanders, who longed for responsive CAS without the 
delays and procedural headaches of Air Force fixed-wing 
support. 
Facing a major insurgency, the Army and Air Force could 
75 Benjamin F. Cooling, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 417. 
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not have been much further apart on issues involving air-land 
doctrine, battlefield cooperation, and the C2 of tactical air 
power. These high-level problems created a great deal of 
confusion and friction for units in the field who already had 
the difficult task of carrying out a flawed counterinsurgency 
strategy. Poor inter-service cooperation also complicated 
fratricide reduction measures because the firepower oriented 
strategy demanded high efficiency to deconflict all fires. 
Inter-service quarrels over the conduct of air-land 
operations, plus an emphasis on overwhelming firepower, 
created favorable conditions for aerial fratricide during the 
Vietnam War. Many incidents occurred even though fire support 
agencies delivered ordnance in Vietnam with greater restraint 
and more concern for safety than in any previous American 
war. 76 Vietnam also exposed how damaging fratricide incidents 
could become in relation to popular support for the U.S. war 
effort. On a linear battlefield, an artillery round fired 
long, or a bomb dropped in error behind enemy lines, was just 
another shot at the enemy. In a war without fronts, any 
mistake was likely to cause casualties, particularly when made 
in or near populated areas. 77 Air-land fratricides in Vietnam 
were more physically and psychologically damaging, because of 
improved weaponry and the nature of guerilla warfare. 
During the battle of the Ia Drang Valley, for example, 
troops were subjected to friendly-fire as the enemy moved in 
close to avoid the devastating firepower of Air Cavalry units. 
The close-in employment of artillery and tactical air power 
punished the enemy but also took its toll on American units. 
76 Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1990), 144. 
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The worst case occurred when a canister of USAF napalm was 
dropped on a U.S. command post, scorching many of the nearby 
troops and killing one soldier. 78 In another case, during the 
battle of Dak To in 1967, the pilot of an F-100 Super Sabre 
jet lost situational awareness and flew in the wrong direction 
over a company of paratroopers. Two bombs were dropped that 
killed 42, wounded 45, and effectively halted the company's 
attempt to capture Hill 87 5. As luck would have it, 53 
different news agencies and reporters were present in the 173d 
Brigade headquarters at the time, and word of the tragic 
incident soon spread to all the newspapers and wire reports. 79 
In another incident during the battle of Dak To, a helicopter 
gun ship approached an infantry company's position and fired 
its rockets right on top of the company, killing the executive 
officer and wounding 29 other troops. 80 
Inadequate target recognition and poor situational 
awareness by FAC's and combat aircrews were responsible for 
many air-land fratricides. For instance, during a firefight in 
the 1st Division area, a misdirected canister of napalm glanced 
off a tall tree and exploded near a group of soldiers. 
Fortunately, no one was seriously injured but the USAF pilot 
attributed the near miss to faulty target identification. 81 
Poor target recognition was responsible for a nighttime 
78 David H. Hackworth, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New York: 
Touchstone l3ooks, 1989), 486. 
79 Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1990), 146. 
80 David H. Hackworth, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New York: 
Touchstone Books, 1989), 776. 
81 Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1990), 146. 
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incident in the III Corps Tactical Zone, when helicopter gun 
ships fired rockets that hit a friendly armored personnel 
carrier, killing two men and wounding three. At the time of 
the incident, the friendly ground forces were attempting to 
adjust the helicopter's fire when the aircrew lost situational 
awareness and some of the rockets strayed and fell short on 
their own position. s;;. 
Target identification was a particularly challenging 
aspect of fighting in the dense jungles of Vietnam. American 
troops employed colored cloth panels, smoke, flares or 
flashing strobe lights at night to make themselves more 
visible and avoid fratricide. During one such incident, 
members of the Vietnamese Irregular Defense Group marked their 
position in the thick jungle by using green smoke. Two Air 
Force bombers were called in to provide ground support, but 
one misidentified the target and managed to hit friendly 
troops, killing four men and wounding 28. 83 This incident 
occurred as a result of confusion over target markings and 
last minute changes to the strike request that decreased 
situational awareness. 
E. SOUTHWEST ASIA 
Diverse combat forces fought the Persian Gulf War at a 
relentless pace, employing state of the art sensors and 
weapons. Combat during Operation Desert Storm was marked by 
fluid, long-range engagements with accurate and lethal weapons 
that crushed the Iraqi military. A review of the Gulf War 
suggests that U.S. acquisition and kill technologies have 
82 Charles R. Schrader, "Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price," Parameters, vol. 8 (Autumn 
1992}, 32. 
83 Geoffiey Regan, Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire (New York: Avon Books, 
1995), 181. 
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outpaced target identification capabilities. Many of the 
combat systems used in Southwest Asia were designed during the 
Cold War to capitalize on range and lethality advantages 
necessary to deal with numerically superior Soviet forces. 
While highly effective, many Cold War weapon systems, like 
Maverick and Hellfire missiles, do not support emerging 
doctrines that emphasize high-tempo operations on a fluid and 
nonlinear battlefield. In addition, some of the current weapon 
systems and air-land tactics compress the time available for 
human decision making and occasionally, they may take the man 
out of the loop altogether. 
The military campaign against Iraq was broken down into 
two phases, an intensive air campaign followed by a massive 
ground assault. The framework for the Coalition's ground 
assault was based on the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, 
which is similar to the maneuver warfare concepts embraced by 
the U.S. Marine Corps. The AirLand Battle concept aims to 
defeat the enemy by conducting simultaneous offensive 
operations over the full breadth and depth of the 
battlefield. 84 It places tremendous demands on combat leaders 
who must be able to fight concurrent battles in close, deep, 
and rear areas. AirLand Battle, like maneuver warfare, hinges 
on the ability of combined arms to shift and concentrate 
firepower at the decisive time and place. 
Tactical air support operations during 
offensive were a key part of the Coalition's 
the ground 
scheme of 
maneuver. Many of the ai:r; sorties flown during the ground 
campaign were CAS missions to destroy or suppress Iraqi forces 
in proximity to friendly units. Offensive air strikes were 
used during day, night, and adverse weather to augment all 
84 U.S. Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian 
GulfWar (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 238. 
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other supporting fires. Joint operational doctrine and 
flexible C2 procedures helped Coalition forces achieve timely 
CAS response times and integrate supporting arms with ongoing 
and planned air-land operations. Yet in spite of the high 
degree of teamwork and unity of effort, Coalition forces 
experienced 28 known instances of fratricide of which nine 
were in the air-to-surface mission area. 85 
During the battle of Khafji in late January, Coalition 
forces suffered multiple casualties from two separate air-land 
fratricides. In one instance, an Air Force A-10 jet fired a 
Maverick air-to-surface missile that malfunctioned while in 
flight, causing it to fall short of the intended target. The 
"smart" missile slammed into a Marine Corps. Light Armored 
Vehicle (LAV) killing seven Marines and wounding two. Normal 
procedures called for the aircraft to attack perpendicular to 
friendly forces but in this case the attack was parallel and 
initiated over friendly forces. The second incident occurred 
when a Marine Corps AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter mistook a 
Saudi armored personnel carrier for an Iraqi vehicle and 
engaged it from long range. Fortunately no one was killed in 
this incident but seven Saudi soldiers were wounded. Air Force 
A-10's were also at fault for a strafing attack against two 
Coalition vehicles. Luckily, only two minor casualties were 
sustained from the A-10 pilot's loss of situational awareness 
and failure to properly identify the designated target. 
In early February, a Marine Corps A-6E Intruder attacked 
a column of Marine artillery and other vehicles moving toward 
the Western Saudi-Kuwaiti border. After making several passes 
over the target area, the pilot dropped a cluster bomb that 
killed one Marine and wounded two. The cause of this incident 
85 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 27. 
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was faulty target identification since the pilot believed the 
ground vehicles to be Iraqi. 
Early in the morning of February 17, 1991, AH-64 Apache 
helicopters launched from their base to conduct an armed 
reconnaissance mission to find and destroy suspected enemy 
vehicles. At approximately 1:00 a.m., one the Apaches fired 
two Hellfire missiles that destroyed two friendly vehicles, 
killing two U.S. soldiers and wounding six others. The pilot, 
who was the commander of the Apache unit, believed that the 
vehicles were enemy because he had lost situational awareness 
and mistakenly read and reported the vehicles' position as 
that of an earlier enemy sighting. 86 An Army investigation of 
the mishap revealed that pilot error led to poor situational 
awareness and misidentification of the friendly vehicles. 
Another key factor that contributed to this fratricide 
incident was the Apache commander's failure to exercise C2 
over the Apache team by virtue of his personal involvement in 
the fighting. 
One of the most politically charged incidents of the Gulf 
War occurred when nine British soldiers were killed and 11 
wounded after Air Force A-10 jets fired Maverick air-to-
surface missiles against their armored personnel carriers. In 
this case, a British FAC had cleared the A-10' s to engage 
Iraqi vehicles inside a 4-km square area of Iraqi territory. 87 
Spotting a large column of armored vehicles, the A-10' s 
proceeded to attack and destroy two British Warrior armored 
personnel carriers believed to be Iraqi T-54/55 tanks. 
86 U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, OPERATION DESERT STORM: Apache 
Helicopter Fratricide Incident, GAO/OSI-93-4 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
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Incident investigations by British and American officials were 
contradictory and inconclusive. Differences between the 
statements of the A-10 pilots and the British FAC could not be 
easily reconstructed against the known facts of incident. 
A British Board of Inquiry was unable to establish why 
the A-10 pilots misidentified the Warrior vehicles as enemy 
T54/55 tanks, particularly in view of earlier identification 
runs made by both pilots at 8,000 feet and 15,000 feet.
88 The 
British maintained that the Americans were 100% responsible 
for the incident which they attributed to navigational error 
and misidentification of the target vehicles (despite the 
British use of inverted "V" markings and colored visual panel 
markers. 
The primary causes of fratricide have remained constant 
despite the changing nature of technology and air-land 
operations. While many factors may contribute to the 
occurrence of air-land fratricide, nearly all of the incidents 
examined in this thesis involved the loss of situational 
awareness or faulty target identification to some degree. 
Upward trends in the fratricide rate suggest that 
technological advances and the growing complexity of warfare 
may exacerbate the primary causes of friendly-fire. As combat 
becomes deadlier, more complex, and maneuver oriented, 
fratricide rates can be expected to climb even higher. Non-
stop air-land operations on current and future battlefields 
will push humans and combat systems to their limits, thereby 
creating favorable conditions for the occurrence of 
fratricide. 
88 Ibid, 153. 
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IV. FRATRICIDE REDUCTION MEASURES 
A. THE CHALLENGE OF FINDING SOLUTIONS 
Fratricide has been an important source of combat 
casualties for the U.S. military. Insights into the causes of 
fratricide have been difficult to obtain because, until 
recently, no serious effort has been made to document the 
total number of U.S. casual ties from friendly-fire. As a 
result, many casualties from fratricide can never be 
identified, and many that were recognized as fratricides were 
probably never reported. The Gulf War was different, because 
all known fratricide incidents were thoroughly investigated. 
The war also changed many perceptions about fratricide, by 
revealing the scope and urgency of the problem to the American 
people and Congressional leaders. Despite the war's short 
duration and light enemy resistance, 24 percent of all U.S. 
battle deaths and 15 percent of all wounds resulted from 
fratricide. Whether or not fratricide in the Persian Gulf was 
particularly high compared with previous conflicts is 
irrelevant since the trend in self-inflicted casualties may 
represent the nature of future conflicts. 89 
Most air-land fratricides occur because of a complex 
chain of events involving the loss of situational awareness 
and the lack of positive target identification. While these 
two variables represent the primary causes of fratricide, most 
incidents of friendly-fire have many causal pathways. This 
suggests that multiple strategies are needed to deal with 
fratricide. It also means there are no simple answers or 
"black box" solutions that will eliminate the problem of 
89 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 2. 
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friendly-fire in all battlefield situations. A balanced and 
complementary fratricide reduction strategy, which approaches 
the problem simultaneously from a technological, doctrinal, 
and organizational perspective is called for. 
B. TECHNOLOGY AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE 
Technology plays a critical role in dealing with some 
conditions that lead to fratricide. Current technical 
ini tia ti ves to address this problem may be grouped into 
immediate, near term (fielded within five years), and mid term 
(fielded within seven or more years) categories. The systems 
currently fielded or under development draw upon both 
cooperative and non-cooperative target recognition techniques. 
In terms of air-land operations, non-cooperative techniques 
are favored since they enable shooters to obtain positive 
hostile identification, a critical requirement for long-range 
weapon engagements. Regardless of the actual technical 
approach, successful antifratricide technologies must meet 
several key criteria: 90 
• Systems must not increase the user's vulnerability 
in the field. 
• Systems must not be too complex or time consuming 
to use. 
• Systems must have applicability at multiple levels 
on the battlefield and should not become too 
specialized. 
• Systems must have a high degree of reliability 
under all battlefield conditions. 
• Systems must be cost effective in light of 
requirements and alternative solutions. 
90 Ibid, 45. 
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1. Immediate Solutions 
Technological measures in the "immediate" category have 
been developed to provide limited tactical protection against 
air-land fratricide. Most of these systems were introduced 
during the Gulf War where they provided low cost, readily 
available solutions to help cut down the risk of fratricide. 
Such "quick fix" solutions can help reduce fratricide if U.S. 
forces are committed to combat before more mature technologies 
are developed and fielded. Specific "quick fix" solutions 
include the BUDD and DARPA lights, receivers for Global 
Positioning System (GPS) data, VS-17 Thermal Cloth Panels, and 
infrared Combat Identification Panels (CIPs). 
a. BUDD and DARPA Lights 
Both of these devices are small, near infrared 
strobes that emit a steady or codeable pulse that can be 
detected by infrared imaging night vision equipment. The 
pocket size BUDD Light has an omnidirectional range of 6-8 km 
and may be strapped onto vehicles or worn by individuals to 
designate them as friendly. 
The DARPA Light was developed by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for use in the Gulf 
War. The DARPA Light operates on the same principle as the 
BUDD Light except it is larger and has an adjustable shroud 
that blocks ground observation while keeping it visible from 
airborne platforms at ranges up to 8 km. 91 The DARPA Lights 
were manufactured and prepared for use in the Gulf War but the 
conflict ended before they could be put to use. 
Near infrared devices like the BUDD and DARPA Lights 
have several drawbacks. First, they are visible to anyone, 
friend or foe, who has night vision image intensifiers. 
91 Ibid, 73. 
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Second, they are not visible to the far infrared imaging 
devices used to aim many U.S. weapon systems. 92 Additionally, 
near infrared devices can easily be obscured or degraded by 
atmospheric effects and terrain masking. 
b. Receivers for GPS Data 
Although not specifically designed to prevent 
friendly-fire casualties, high technology navigational systems 
like GPS, help reduce the risk of inadvertently firing on 
friendly ground forces. 93 Provided in large numbers to 
Coalition forces during the Gulf War, these passive devices 
enabled units to pinpoint their locations and navigate 
throughout the featureless desert. The widespread use of GPS 
receivers during the Gulf War helped units stay in assigned 
sectors, employ fire support weapons from precise locations, 
and maintain situational awareness during highly fluid combat 
situations. While having a GPS receiver is not insurance 
against fratricide, being able to navigate and report 
battlefield positions accurately does cut down the risk of 
self-inflicted casualties. 
c. VS-17 Thermal Cloth Panels 
In addition to standard markings on all combat 
vehicles, ground forces may use colored panels to help pilots 
identify surface targets. Thermal panels are a refinement of 
traditional cloth panels because they enhance the 
identification process during day, night, and adverse weather 
conditions. The VS-17 panels are best suited for daylight and 
fair-weather use. The use of VS-17 colored panels on the roof 
of combat vehicles improves all-around visibility within a few 
92 Ibid, 74. 
93 U.S. Department ofDefense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian 
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kilometers however, some important disadvantages must be 
considered. First, VS-17 panels are visible to friend and foe. 
The enemy can use this information to identify U.S. units and 
possibly confuse identification efforts by applying the same 
markings to his own forces. Second, air-to-surface detection 
ranges vary greatly depending on atmospheric conditions. The 
operational parameters of most fixed-wing CAS aircraft will 
often exceed the range at which the panels can be detected and 
identified before weapons release. 
d. Combat Identification Panels 
The CIP is a rectangular piece of aluminum covered 
with durable thermal or infrared reflective tape that is 
attached to multiple points on combat vehicles. The thermal I 
infrared tape-covered CIP provides an aid in distinguishing 
friendly and enemy vehicles when thermal imaging sights are 
used. The CIP operates as a thermal mirror that reflects 
temperature away from cooler areas such as the sky. This 
reflection is only visible to thermal sights that detect the 
unique "cold spot" created by the CIP. The device is useful to 
identify friendly forces in the close, direct-fire battle, but 
even with infrared reflecting tape it has limited value for 
CAS platforms. CAS aircraft may not be able to detect and 
identify CIP equipped forces at tactically useful ranges. 
2. Near Term Solutions 
Technological measures in this category are designed to 
expand upon many immediate solutions introduced during the 
Gulf War. Most of the systems are simple, built with off-the-
shelf technologies, and nearing either completion or prototype 
field-testing with U.S. units. Some of the most prominent 
near-term systems to enhance CID and decrease air-land 
fratricide include the Battlefield Combat Identification 
System (BCIS), the Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply 
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(SABER), and the Forward Observer/Forward Air Control System 
(FO/FAC). 
a. Battlefield Combat Identification System 
The BCIS is a cooperative, all-weather, digitally 
encrypted question and answer system that provides a ground-
based IFF capability for combat vehicles. 94 The operational 
concept calls for a BCIS-equipped unit to interrogate a ground 
target via a highly directional millimeter wave (MMW) antenna 
while the interrogated unit responds via an omnidirectional 
MMW band antenna. 95 The use of MMW technology enables BCIS to 
provide greater range and penetration than laser and infrared 
systems through the conditions of a "dirty" battlefield (e.g., 
smoke, haze, rain, etc.). Adding a digital data link to the 
standard BCIS configuration provides a substantial increase in 
overall system performance. Data-link-configured BCIS 
platforms will be able to exchange information with other 
BCIS-equipped forces, thus enhancing collective situational 
awareness and target identification for air-land engagements. 
Long-term plans call for a joint, integrated capability that 
can be employed with other target identification and 
situational awareness enhancing initiatives on the digitized 
battlefield. 
BCIS provides many combat advantages such as a low 
probability of detection, high reliability, and embedded GPS 
position information. Unfortunately, its cost (roughly $20,000 
per unit) may be prohibitive in light of competing budget 
94 Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Battlefield Combat Identification System 
(BCIS) (Washington D.C.: 1993), 2. 
95 U.S. Department ofDefense, Office of the Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition 
and Technology) Combat Identification Task Force Architecture Working Group Final Report 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 2-5. 
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demands and the total number of air-land platforms that must 
be fitted with the new hardware. 
b. Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply 
The SABER is a Navy-developed, man-portable system 
that uses GPS data and ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite 
communications (SATCOM) to provide coded battlefield awareness 
information to C2 nodes and warfighting platforms. 96 Using 
line-of-sight UHF and SATCOM over the horizon communications, 
users relay their identification and GPS parameters (location, 
course, speed, altitude, and time) to all other SABER-equipped 
users. 97 Through this data relay, a SABER-equipped unit can 
find any other SABER platform within line of sight, or a C2 
node can monitor platform locations and movements over the 
horizon through UHF SATCOM connectivity. 
The planned architecture for SABER encompasses 
global, theater, and line-of-sight networks. Transceiver 
beacons can be provided for all major combatant elements such 
as ships, tanks, aircraft, and personnel while C2 terminals can 
be deployed aboard ships, wide-bodied aircraft, or ground 
stations. The SABER system enhances flexibility for users by 
combining accurate, real-time GPS positional data with an 
improved knowledge of the tactical environment. When coupled 
to the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and Link 16 
(Tactical Digital Information Link-J), SABER provides 
commanders with the capability to follow the movements and 
activities of friendly forces in theater. 98 While SABER has 
many positive attributes, there are some limitations to 
96 Austin Boyd, "Know Your Friends," Space Tracks, (Fall 1995), 2. 
97 Ibid, 2. 
98 Ibid, 4. 
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widespread use of the system. For instance, the enemy could 
jam or exploit the UHF and SATCOM pathways used by the system. 
In addition, serious short-term consequences might result if 
an operational beacon were to fall into the wrong hands. Armed 
with a SABER unit, the enemy could have detailed knowledge 
(for up to 24 hours or until the encryption was changed) of 
all SABER-equipped forces in the area of operations. 
c. Forward Observer/Forward Air Control 
The FO/FAC system is a one-man, integrated, target 
acquisition system that provides all the functional 
capabilities forward observers and forward air controllers 
need to accomplish current and future missions. 99 The system 
consists of four main components: a GPS antenna, a laser 
rangefinder/compass that has been integrated into binoculars, 
a tactical computer planning station, and a hand-held control 
display unit. The system easily interfaces with Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) currently fielded 
throughout the U.S. military. Users of the FO/FAC system are 
provided with a method to designate, interrogate, and identify 
ground targets to CAS aircraft. The use of burst transmission 
techniques speeds the exchange of critical "nine line mission 
brief" information between the FAC and supporting CAS 
aircraft. 
With the new system, FAC's no longer have to rely on 
imprecise and time-consuming methods to attack close-in 
targets with supporting arms. Aboard properly equipped CAS 
aircraft, the pilot receives the tactical air request via the 
automatic target hand-off system (ATHS) . The ATHS provides a 
visual indication on the heads-up display of where the target 
99 Stephen V. Giusto and Phillip M. Patch, "FO/FAC: Forward Observer/Forward Air 
Controller," Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 80 no. 4 (April1996), 21. 
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should be, based on information provided by the FAC. The 
FO/FAC system represents a significant improvement in the way 
traditional CAS procedures are carried out. Use of the system 
enhances CAS aircraft survivability, streamlines the tactical 
air request process, and minimizes air-land confusion that 
often results in the loss of situational awareness and 
fratricide. 
3. Mid Term Solutions 
Mid term technological measures will be used to develop 
the ideal combat identification system. The requirement calls 
for an integrated, embedded situational awareness, and 
positive identification capability that provides an automatic 
data hand-off from sensor to shooter. Mid term solutions 
emphasize the application of advanced NCTR and multi-sensor 
identification technologies. In addition, automated C
2
, data 
fusion, advanced infrared, electro optical, and radar 
technologies will be used on a large-scale to enhance 
situational awareness and target identification. By digitizing 
the battle space, U.S. forces aim to achieve dominance over 
future adversaries while reducing friendly vulnerabilities 
through enhanced situational awareness, real- time information 
sharing, and positive target identification. 
C. THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE 
Since doctrine plays such a critical role in how military 
organizations plan, organize, and conduct operations, it 
stands to reason that it also provides many opportunities to 
address the problem of fratricide. Traditionally, fratricide 
avoidance measures have not received much emphasis in 
doctrinal publications. Fortunately, this situation has 
changed over the last few years as people have become more 
interested in understanding why fratricide occurs. Military 
organizations are assimilating many lessons learned from 
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training, exercises, and operations for the purpose of 
updating doctrines and challenging previously accepted ways of 
operating. 
For example the current edition of Joint Pub 3-09.3, 
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 
Support, addresses the impact of fratricide on the CAS 
process. This joint service publication identifies many areas 
in the CAS mission cycle requiring special attention because 
the potential risks of fratricide may be high. It also 
contains fratricide prevention guidance that joint forces at 
the tactical level may easily understand and apply. Joint Pub 
3-09.3 provides standardized, situation-specific guidance that 
is applicable to conduct effective and safe joint CAS. Use of 
this publication by joint and multinational forces strengthens 
interoperability and reduces battlefield confusion which in 
turn, lessens the risks of fratricide. 
As Joint Pub 3-09.3 illustrates, the development cycle 
for doctrine now incorporates fratricide awareness and risk 
assessment measures. Applicable doctrinal publications are 
being developed, reviewed, and validated with fratricide 
awareness and risk reduction measures in mind. This provides 
a common frame of reference for users in the field to identify 
high-risk missions and procedures, so that appropriate 
fratricide avoidance techniques may be implemented. This 
thesis does not suggest that fratricide reduction should be 
the main consideration in the development of doctrine. 
However, it argues that fratricide is a battlefield reality 
that doctrine must thoroughly address in peacetime training 
and in war. 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL REMEDIES 
Before the Gulf War there was surprisingly little concern 
in the U.S. defense establishment about fratricide in combat. 
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Perhaps this was caused by perceptions that fratricide was not 
a significant source of battlefield casualties or conversely, 
that nothing could be done to address a problem that seems to 
be inherent in the chaos and "fog of war." Accidents, it may 
be thought, will happen. Either way, fratricides usually claim 
many casualties and provide a source of embarrassment for the 
military. This embarrassment may provide an incentive for 
military organizations to downplay the severity of fratricide. 
They may also explain why the U.S. military did so little to 
overcome the problem of friendly-fire or how to integrate CID 
efforts before the Gulf War. 
The high ratio of friendly-fire casualties during Desert 
Storm reveals a degree of organizational complacency in the 
realm of CID and fratricide avoidance. Since the end of the 
Gulf War, the U.S. has pursued many organizational reforms to 
improve CID capabilities and reduce fratricide. This study 
examines some of these efforts from an organizational and 
training perspective. 
1. Restructuring the Bureaucracy 
The post Gulf War military faced tremendous pressures to 
downsize and restructure. This reorganization established a 
national-level program to integrate all joint CID issues. The 
key components of the present day Department of Defense (DOD) 
CID effort include the General Officer Steering Committee for 
Combat Identification (GOSC-CID), the Joint Combat 
Identification Office (JCIDO), and the All Service Combat 
Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET) . 
The GOSC-CID was established in 1993 to provide senior-
level review and coordination of all Army, Navy, Air Force, 
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and Marine Corps CID requirements . 100 The committee, which 
includes two Flag Officers or Senior Executive Service 
representatives from each Service, functions as the senior 
military interface with Congress, industry, and the 
international military community. The main function of the 
GOSC-CID is to ensure the development and implementation of 
the Joint CID Master Plan that contains Service-unique CID 
requirements, milestones, and programs. The GOSC-CID reports 
to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) which 
provides final direction on all material and non-material 
related CID efforts within the U.S. defense establishment. 
Subordinate to the GOSC-CID, the JCIDO was established to 
provide action officer level coordination on all DOD CID 
efforts and to serve as the primary center of information for 
all CID issues, programs, and requirements. 101 Operating from 
the Pentagon, the JCIDO is the hub around which all Service 
level CID requirements, organizations, and programs function 
to ensure commonality and integration with the CID Master 
Plan. The Director of the JCIDO reports directly to the 
Chairman of the GOSC-CID and provides support and direction 
for the ASCIET. 
The ASCIET stemmed from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) sponsored Joint Air Defense Operations/ Joint 
Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ) Joint Test and Evaluation Program 
conducted during fiscal years 1990 through 1994. 102 The 
100 U.S. Department ofDefense, Office ofthe Vice Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff 
USA/USN/USAF/USMC Memorandum of Agreement on Combat Identification (Washington 
D.C.: January 1993), 2. 
101 Ibid, 3. 
102 U.S. Department ofDefense, Chairman, General Officer Steering Committee for 
Combat Identification USA/USN/USAF /USMC Memorandum of Agreement on the All Service 
Combat Identification Evaluation Team (Washington D.C.: September 1994), 1. 
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JADO/JEZ program was an early attempt by the military to 
address the problems of shared airspace between aircraft and 
surface-to-air missiles so that joint engagements could be 
conducted with minimum fratricide risk. This program evolved 
into the ASCIET in October 1994 at the direction of the JROC. 
ASCIET is an expanding organization that fosters new ideas 
about tactics, ·techniques, and procedures across all CID 
mission areas. ASCIET is chartered to employ the equipment and 
personnel of all the Services to evaluate, 




The first ASCIET exercise was conducted during September 
1995 in the Gulfport, Mississippi area and incorporated sea-
air-land forces to evaluate joint C3 I and CID systems and 
procedures. The annual, two-week exercise provides training 
opportunities to all participants on CID and fratricide 
avoidance techniques. The use of instrumented ranges, video 
teleconferencing capabilities, and mass debriefs provides a 
forum for the Services to examine their CID capabilities. 
ASCIET provides an effective means to challenge participants 
and test combat systems in realistic force-on-force scenarios. 
The goal of ASCIET is to enhance joint interoperability and 
understanding about the battlefield conditions that complicate 
unit identification efforts. 
2. Training Measures 
Training is the key to combat effectiveness and therefore 
is the focus of effort of a peacetime military. 104 While 
technology and doctrine may improve CID and help reduce 
103 Ibid, 1. 
104 Department of the Navy, FMFM-1 Warfighting (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1989), 46. 
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fratricide, their cumulative effects will be marginal without 
well-trained military leaders and troops. Training programs 
that emphasize the crawl-walk-run approach are an integral 
part of current fratricide reduction efforts. To provide 
maximum value, training must identify critical deficiencies 
that can be addressed through realistic and complementary 
exercises. 
a. Unit Level Training 
Unit training programs are an important link in the 
fratricide prevention chain. Training priorities should 
reflect practical, challenging, and progressive goals 
beginning with individual and small-unit skills and 
culminating in a combined arms view of air-land warfare. 105 
Special measures to enhance CID and fratricide awareness must 
be continuous and closely aligned with regular training 
programs. This approach develops individual and small-unit 
warfighting skills by highlighting some of the key factors 
that contribute to fratricide. For instance, frequent and 
specialized training on subjects like combat vehicle 
recognition, ROE, and risk management techniques build on 
routine training by minimizing the potential for fratricide. 
The use of simulations and combat modeling 
techniques are additional ways to reinforce individual skills 
and unit level training programs. Simulators are highly useful 
training devices that provide combat system operators with 
realistic scenarios that represent real-world CID challenges. 
Personnel being trained on simulators or with combat modeling 
programs must be thoroughly evaluated on their ability to 
accomplish tactical scenarios without causing fratricide. This 
is a longstanding problem since most computer models and 
105 Ibid, 4 7 0 
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simulations do not deal with the intricacies of CID and 
fratricide. Most training simulations make no provision for 
examining the effects or causes of fratricide . 106 
b. Training at Major Command Levels 
Training functions at division/wing levels and 
higher strive to integrate assets and build on the diverse and 
complementary capabilities of subordinate units. Major field 
commands play a vital role in ensuring that subordinates are 
combat ready and able to function as highly cohesive elements 
of the total force. To get the most value out of training, 
major commands must be able to measure, analyze, and critique 
operations on the simulated battlefield. Live training against 
opposing forces in scenario-driven exercises is an excellent 
way to assess unit proficiency and identify the fratricide 
risk potential of most battlefield functions. Large-scale 
exercises on instrumented ranges provide a unique and 
realistic opportunity to synchronize the actions of all 
participants and collect valuable data that may shed some 
light on how fratricides occur and how they can be avoided. 
One of the best examples of such focused, air-land 
battle training is the Air Warrior exercise conducted 
regularly at the U.S. Army National Training Center (NTC). Air 
Warrior evolutions are designed to provide fighter aircrews, 
senior Army commanders, and joint battle staffs with CAS and 
air interdiction training in a realistic, simulated combat 
environment . 107 Army brigades participating in Air Warrior 
exercises are encouraged to train and maneuver on the 
106 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, 
OTA-ISC-537 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 47. 
107 U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, 549th Combat Training Squadron, Air Warrior 
96-06 Final Report, (Nellis AFB, Nevada, March 1996), 2. 
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instrumented ranges of the NTC as they would during real world 
operations. The exercise offers a great opportunity to refine 
the warfighting skills of joint and multinational air-land 
forces by duplicating the high tempo, stress, and uncertainty 
of the modern battlefield. 
The rate of fratricide during training missions 
becomes a key indicator of the systemic functioning of all 
units. Immediate and accurate after action reporting through 
the use of video teleconferencing and automated debriefing 
systems provide a forum to reinforce the learning process and 
measure operational success or failure in the training 
environment. During mock training battles, fratricides are 
viewed as negative statistics that all participants may 
critically analyze to understand the causes of friendly-fire. 
The Air Warrior exercise is just one example of how battle 
focused training at the major command level can have an 
immediate and positive impact on fratricide awareness. 
There are no simple solutions to the compound 
problem of fratricide. Realistic and challenging exercises 
like Air Warrior and ASCIET enable major commands to notably 
improve their combat efficiency and minimize the potential for 
fratricide. The pursuit of such joint and multilateral 
training activities create open and honest working 
relationships and allow participants to analyze what really 
happened on the training battlefield. At the major command 
level, the key to dealing with the fratricide problem is to 
train subordinates on the proper ways to orchestrate tactical 
air operations with ground maneuver. Reducing fratricide at 
the upper echelons of any military organization clearly 
depends on a balanced and complementary approach that 
incorporates the benefits of technology, doctrine, and 
organization. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Fratricide is a serious and persistent problem that is 
aggravated by the complexity of the modern combat environment 
and the increasing lethality of weapons. This thesis has 
identified many of the factors that contribute to the 
occurrence of air-land fratricide. The following are the main 
research findings of this study: 
1. The loss of situational awareness and the 
lack of positive target identification account for 
most incidents of air-land fratricide. 
Fratricide has been an important and largely unrecognized 
source of combat casualties for the U.S. military. Although 
every fratricide incident is unique, history suggests that 
most friendly fire casualties result from the loss of 
situational awareness and the lack of positive target 
identification. The effects of these two primary factors are 
attenuated by fluid, air-land operations that complicate 
efforts to maintain situational awareness and differentiate 




target acquisition and weapon system 
have outpaced target identification 
Most of the combat systems currently used by the U.S. 
military were designed during the Cold War to exploit range 
and lethality advantages necessary to deal with numerically 
superior Warsaw Pact forces. While these state-of-the-art 
combat systems are highly effective, they do not support air-
land doctrines that emphasize high tempo operations on a 
nonlinear battlefield. The imbalance between weapons and 
target identification capabilities is further complicated by 
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the preference of U.S. forces to operate at night and under 
conditions of limited visibility. While these conditions 
provide natural battlefield advantages, they also make target 
identification more problematic. 
3. Effective air-land operations demand teamwork 
and close integration between air and land forces. 
Today's air-land battlefield is characterized by highly 
mobile forces operating at high speed over vast areas while 
employing lethal weapons from beyond visual range. Joint 
operational doctrine is also more sophisticated and reliant on 
the synchronized employment of combined arms, especially air 
power. Maneuver warfare techniques further complicates 
friendly efforts to maintain situational awareness and 
positively identify targets. A high degree of inter-service 
cooperation and combat integration is necessary to achieve 
operational synergy between air and land forces. This is 
particularly true during deliberate attacks where the massing 
of combat units and the high density of weapons systems 
greatly enhance the risk of fratricide. 
4. Fratricide can be reduced but not eliminated. 
Fratricide is a battlefield reality that is as enduring 
as warfare itself. The primary causes of fratricide (loss of 
situational awareness and lack of positive target 
identification) persist despite vast changes in weapons 
technology and the way air-land operations are carried out. 
Experienced leaders recognize that combat is inherently 
dangerous and that reasonable measures must be taken to assess 
and reduce the risk of fratricide. While practical steps can 
be taken to reduce the risk of friendly-fire, there are no 
simple solutions to fratricide. A balanced and complementary 
approach that embodies technology, doctrine, and 
organizational remedies offers the greatest payoff in reducing 
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the risk of fratricide. Warfare is simply too complex and 
unpred?-ctable to unfold with the precision and certainty 
necessary to eliminate the risk of fratricide. 
5. The American public and government leaders 
have become more aware of casualties caused by 
friendly fire. 
The large number of friendly fire casualties sustained by 
U.S. forces during the Persian Gulf War provided a much needed 
"reality check" for the American people and members of 
Congress. Before the Gulf War people had been largely ignorant 
of the scope or urgency of the fratricide problem. As a 
result, the total number of U.S. casualties from friendly fire 
have never been accurately documented or analyzed. Today the 
U.S. defense establishment does a much better job of 
identifying, reporting, documenting, and analyzing all 
instances of friendly fire. Appropriate national-and service-
level organizations have been established to administer CID 
and fratricide reduction efforts. High-level interest and 
extensive media coverage of Gulf War fratricides changed many 
perceptions about the nature of friendly fire incidents. In 
the absence of comprehensive solutions, current sensitivities 
about fratricide-related casualties may undermine popular 
support for U.S. military operations. This may become 
critically important in the future, especially in low-
intensity settings where U.S. national interests may be 
limited in scope, or inherently ambiguous. 
6. Fratricide can significantly degrade U.S. 
warfighting capabilities. 
Fratricidal effects have the potential to render units 
ineffective, thereby threatening mission completion and 
battlefield survival. The physical and psychological effects 
of fratricide can disrupt operations across the entire 
battlefield. The secondary effects may be just as devastating, 
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producing paralysis, loss of confidence in supporting arms, 
loss of initiative, and risk aversion. Combat leaders must be 
attuned to the detrimental effects of fratricide, but not to 
the extent that they become too cautious, indecisive, or 
unwilling to take calculated risks. Concerns over the 
occurrence of fratricide may also drive the ROE to restrictive 
extremes, thereby limiting the combat effectiveness of U.S. 
weapon systems. The full potential of the U.S. military cannot 
be realized unless fratricide rates are brought under tight 
control. 
7. Most target identifications are visual. 
Despite U.S. technological advancements, the process of 
identifying ground combat systems and troop formations remains 
largely visual. The range at which positive identification can 
be accomplished by visual techniques, relative to optimum 
weapons acquisition and firing range, is marginal in daylight 
and inadequate at night or when visibility is limited. Targets 
can be acquired and engaged at long range, but they cannot be 
positively identified at long range because current visual 
techniques do not support such actions. This poses major 
problems for U.S. combat forces who can acquire and kill 
targets from beyond visual range but cannot identify them 
except through close-in, visual techniques. Even at close-in 
ranges, visual recognition skills and training become key 
considerations for target identification and fratricide 
avoidance. Additionally, threat recognition skills are 
perishable and subject to errors in human perception and 
interpretation. Maintaining proficiency requires constant 
training and attention to detail. Most U.S. combat systems 
require shooters to see and recognize targets before 
classifying them as friendly, hostile, or neutral. Sorting out 
friends and foes by visual means is extremely difficult, 
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especially when visibility is poor or when other factors 
degrade target identification efforts. Today's high technology 
target identification systems are quite sensitive to 
battlefield degradation and the many shortcomings of human 
operators. 
8. Similarities between friendly and enemy 
combat systems degrade target identification efforts 
and increase the risk of fratricide. 
The appearance of virtually identical or similar combat 
systems among friendly, neutral, and hostile forces adds one 
more layer of complexity and uncertainty to an already 
difficult target identification process. Uncertainty about the 
friendly or hostile character of targets on the battlefield 
can generate widespread confusion, indecision, and the loss of 
aggressiveness during fire and maneuver. It also contributes 
to the likelihood of fratricidal exchanges in battle. 
Transfers and sales of U.S. arms to countries throughout the 
world have increased the possibility that someday, American 
forces will fight an adversary equipped with virtually 
identical combat systems. 
9. ~litary Coalitions are ad-hoc organizations 
that may be polarized by fratricide incidents. 
Multinational operations are among the most complex and 
demanding of all military activities. Since Coalitions are ad-
hoc arrangements, they are often highly susceptible to 
disjointed command relationships, poor cooperative planning, 
and misgivings about sharing information and state of the art 
technologies. High fratricide rates may drive a wedge between 
Coalition partners leading to organizational strife and 
political instability. It is in the U.S. interest to help 
Allies and Coalition partners avoid fratricidal attacks on 
themselves or on U.S. forces. 
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10. Human operators are the weak link in the 
fratricide prevention chain. 
Warfare places extreme demands on all participants. Air-
land operations on today's battlefield are complex and 
unforgiving. This suggests that meticulous planning, close 
supervision, and team oriented activities are of vital 
importance. Modern combat has become so complex and 
interconnected that human operators are often stretched beyond 
their performance limits to manage operations and control 
highly lethal technologies. Indi victuals can easily become 
disoriented and lose touch with the "actual" situation around 
them. Such dangerous situations are exacerbated by "round the 
clock" operations that demand sound judgement and zero defects 
from people at all times. Human errors are an inevitable 
aspect of warfare. No matter how hard people try, mistakes may 
sometimes occur that result in fratricidal losses. 
Unfortunately, operating on the high technology battlefield 
leaves little margin for error or human deficiencies. 
B. U. S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations aim to identify areas where 
there is room for improvement in carrying out air-land 
operations with minimum risk of fratricide. These policy 
recommendations hinge upon the belief that fratricide risks 
can be assessed, identified, and decreased with virtually no 
degradation to the warfighting efficiency of U.S. military 
forces. Specific recommendations include: 
1. Maintain the current broad-based emphasis on 
enhancing CID and avoiding fratricide. 
The U.S. defense establishment is on the right track to 
deal with the intricacies of CID and fratricide. Senior level 
interest and adequate resource allocation in an austere budget 
climate are crucial to long-term improvements in CID and 
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reductions in fratricide rates. Current measures to deal with 
fratricide are still insufficient to meet future operational 
requirements. Fratricide prevention must remain a funding and 
leadership priority at the national level, among the combatant 
commands, and within each of the military Services. 
2. Greater emphasis on training and professional 
education. 
There are no simple answers or "black box" solutions to 
the complex problem of fratricide. Training offers the most 
immediate and readily attainable way to deal with fratricide. 
Focused, air-land battle exercises like Air Warrior and ASCIET 
allow diverse combat forces to realistically integrate their 
warfighting activities, thus revealing potential weaknesses 
that could result in fratricide. Unquestionably, a more 
educated military force will be able to assess the dynamics of 
fratricide and implement appropriate risk-reduction measures. 
This enhances the ability of combat units to accomplish the 
mission, protect their troops, and focus all weapon systems 
squarely against the enemy. 
3. The U.S. should vigorously pursue CID and 
fratricide avoidance capabilities with Alliance 
partners. 
The end of the Cold War and budget constraints in the 
United States and among North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) members have altered military priorities. Nevertheless, 
multinational operations demand military forces that are 
interoperable and able to differentiate friend from foe on the 
battlefield. By virtue of its unparalleled military 
capabilities, the United States should assume the leading role 
in Alliance CID and fratricide avoidance efforts. This action 
should help focus cooperative efforts and ensure NATO-wide 
systems compatibility to deal with new risks and operational 
tasks on the multinational battlefield. 
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4. Insist that new weapon systems have integrated 
CID capabilities that are commensurate with target 
engagement ranges. 
Future weapon systems should have embedded CID 
capabilities that reduce the risk of fratricide for all target 
engagements within normal design parameters. Enhanced 
capabilities for CID and fratricide avoidance should be part 
of the design and system development process and not merely an 
afterthought. Military requirements in CID and fratricide 
avoidance for new combat systems must be clearly articulated 
in Mission Need Statements (MNS) and Operational Requirement 
Documents (ORD) . Defense contractors should be reminded that 
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